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THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE HABEAS CORPUS
SUSPENSION CLAUSE, THE RIGHT OF NATURAL
LIBERTY, AND EXECUTIVE DISCRETION
John Harrison*
The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause of Article I, Section 9, is primarily a limit
on Congress’s authority to authorize detention by the executive. It is not mainly con-
cerned with the remedial writ of habeas corpus, but rather with the primary right of
natural liberty. Suspensions of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are statutes
that vest very broad discretion in the executive to decide which individuals to hold in
custody. Detention of combatants under the law of war need not rest on a valid suspen-
sion, whether the combatant is an alien or a citizen of the United States. The Suspension
Clause does not affirmatively require that the federal courts have any jurisdiction to
issue the writ of habeas corpus, and so does not interfere with Congress’s general
control over the jurisdiction of the federal courts. The clause does not impose any
limits on congressional authority with respect to the habeas corpus jurisdiction of
state courts that would not exist in its absence.
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INTRODUCTION
The Constitution’s most important protection of individuals’ most important right
forbids broad grants of discretion to the executive, and hence the President.1 That
protection is the Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause.2 The clause mainly protects free-
dom from confinement—natural liberty—and not the remedy that vindicates that right
in court—the writ of habeas corpus.3 Suspensions of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus are statutes that give the executive very broad discretion to hold individuals in
confinement.4 Grants of detention authority that substantially limit executive discretion
are consistent with the clause.5 The clause thus secures not only natural liberty, but
also the principle that basic interests are secured by the law against the executive and
are not held subject to the executive’s arbitrary choices.6 It implements the rule of law.
The clause’s original meaning was almost completely lost for more than a century,
for a quite understandable reason: its reference to the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus indicates that the clause deals with that writ.7 As Professors Paul Halliday
and Amanda Tyler have shown, however, it mainly protects a primary, substantive
interest.8 It limits Congress’s authority to enable the federal executive to physically
confine individuals and thereby interfere with their natural liberty.9
1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
2 Id.
3 See Amanda L. Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125
HARV. L. REV. 901, 903–04 (2012).
4 See id. at 904–06.
5 See id. at 903–04.
6 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
7 See Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial
Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575, 581 (2008).
8 Id. at 586; Tyler, supra note 3, at 903–04.
9 For decades the common view was that suspension of habeas corpus prevented the courts
from issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and thereby inquiring into the lawfulness of confinement
by the executive, but did not expand the executive’s detention authority. See, e.g., Trevor W.
Morrison, Hamdi’s Habeas Puzzle: Suspension as Authorization?, 91 CORNELL L.REV. 411,
416 (2006) (asserting that suspension removes the remedy but does not authorize detention
that was not already lawful). In 2008, Professors Halliday and White pointed out that “[t]he
[British] suspension statutes expanded one power rather than curtail another. Even during
periods of suspension, the common law writ of habeas corpus never lapsed, even if the Crown
received new capacities to detain accused traitors without trial for carefully limited spells.”
Halliday & White, supra note 7, at 618. Professor Halliday treats English practice in great
detail in PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010). In 2009,
Professor Amanda Tyler published a study that emphasizes that suspensions go to the substance
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Despite that substantial progress, important issues remain to be resolved. One
concerns the kind of detention authority that qualifies as a suspension and hence
may be granted only in case of invasion or rebellion. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice
Scalia argued in his dissent that U.S. citizens who are enemy combatants may be
detained only pursuant to a valid suspension, not as prisoners under the law of war.10
Professor Tyler takes a similar position, arguing that, absent a valid suspension,
individuals subject to the law of treason may be held on criminal or national security
grounds only pursuant to the ordinary requirements of criminal procedure.11
Another question concerns the relationship between the Suspension Clause and
the judicial remedy of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court’s current position is that
the clause ensures that federal courts be able to administer the writ as it was known
to the common law.12 Another possibility is that the clause has no implications for
the habeas authority of the federal courts, but limits Congress’s power to restrict such
authority as the state courts hold.
This Article reinforces the conclusion that the Suspension Clause is mainly a
limit on Congress’s power to give detention authority to the executive, and therefore
mainly a protection of the substantive right of natural liberty. The clause limits Con-
gress’s power to confer on the executive very broad discretion to detain individuals.13
It does not affect the executive’s authority to hold prisoners under the law of war,
whether they are citizens or aliens and whether the armed conflict is internal or in-
ternational.14 Law of war detention is governed by legal rules, not executive discre-
tion, and British and American practice before the Constitution show that subjects
and citizens could be held as prisoners of war without suspension of the privilege
of habeas corpus.15 The Suspension Clause does not give the federal courts authority
to administer the writ, nor does it require that Congress confer such authority.16
While the clause may limit Congress’s power over the habeas jurisdiction of the
state courts, any such limits are redundant of those that arise because Congress does
not have general authority over the state courts’ jurisdiction, and because its ability
to restrict their jurisdiction that arises from Congress’s substantive powers is subject
to substantive limits, including the Suspension Clause itself.17
of the interest in natural liberty by expanding executive detention authority. Amanda L. Tyler,
Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 605 (2009). Her most recent work
on the subject is AMANDA L. TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME: FROM THE TOWER OF
LONDON TO GUANTANAMO BAY (2017).
10 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11 Tyler, supra note 3, at 907.
12 Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723, 771, 780 (2008) (stating that the Suspension Clause
secures the judicial remedy of habeas corpus).
13 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14 Id. at 519 (plurality opinion).
15 See generally Tyler, supra note 3.
16 See Halliday & White, supra note 7, at 580.
17 See id. at 697.
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Part I deals with British usage and practice prior to the framing of the Constitu-
tion.18 In British legal usage, “suspension of habeas corpus” and cognate terms were
used to describe statutes that authorized criminal detention on weaker evidence, and
for longer than allowed by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.19 The Habeas Corpus
Act applied only to detention on criminal or supposed criminal grounds, and statutes
that were called suspensions of it expanded the criminal detention authority of the
Crown.20 “Suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act” and similar phrases were not
applied to other statutes authorizing detention on national security grounds, including
statutes providing for a military draft, and a statute adopted in 1782 that explicitly
authorized the King to hold British subjects as prisoners of war.21
Part II turns to American practice immediately prior to the Constitution.22 During
the Revolution, American states extended the concept of suspension of habeas corpus
beyond its British meaning.23 A number of states adopted suspension statutes that au-
thorized detention on grounds of dangerousness, without the suspicion of prior
criminal behavior that British suspensions required.24 During the Revolutionary War,
the Continental Army held Loyalist American citizens who served with the British
Army and were taken captive, as prisoners of war, just as the British held Americans
as prisoners of war.25 The application of the terminology of suspension of habeas
corpus to the new American forms of discretionary detention authority became clear
in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which referred to such statutes as sus-
pensions of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and provided the language of
the Federal Suspension Clause.26
Part III traces the evolution of the Suspension Clause in the Federal Convention.27
It then discusses references to the clause in the ratification debates. Part IV offers an
interpretation of the substantive protection to natural liberty provided by the Suspension
Clause.28 A suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is legislation grant-
ing the executive extremely broad discretion to detain.29 British and American suspen-
sion statutes granted broad discretion and were regarded as dangerous for just that
reason.30 Detention authority bounded by law is not so dangerous and does not
18 See infra Part I.
19 See Tyler, supra note 3, at 907.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 950.
22 See infra Part II.
23 See Tyler, supra note 3, at 962.
24 Id. at 960–61.
25 Id. at 1007.
26 Id. at 963.
27 See infra Part III.
28 See infra Part IV.
29 See Tyler, supra note 3, at 959.
30 Id. at 932.
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constitute suspension.31 This reading explains why forms of detention authority that
are substantially bound by law, including law of war detention, are not suspensions
within the meaning of the clause.
The Suspension Clause is concerned mainly with the primary right of natural
liberty and executive authority to restrict it, not with the judicial remedy of habeas
corpus.32 Part V addresses the question whether the Suspension Clause affects Con-
gress’s authority with respect to the writ.33 It argues that the clause imposes no af-
firmative requirement that federal habeas jurisdiction exist, and in general does not
affect Congress’s power over habeas in federal court. Any restrictions the clause
might impose on congressional legislation with respect to habeas in state court are
cumulative of restrictions that exist without the clause, mainly because Congress
does not have the general authority over state courts that it has over federal courts.34
I. HABEAS CORPUS SUSPENSION IN BRITISH LAW
PRIOR TO THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
This section describes British legal usage and practice prior to the American found-
ing. It shows that the phrase “suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act” and cognate
phrases like “suspension of the habeas corpus” referred to a particular kind of statute:
those that expanded the criminal detention authority of the Crown beyond what the
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 permitted.35 Suspension statutes operated only on detention
authority and did not affect the writ itself, which could be issued while a suspension
was in effect.36 “Suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act” and similar phrases were not
used to refer to statutes that gave the Crown noncriminal detention authority, like
statutes authorizing a military draft or enabling the Crown to hold rebels as prisoners
of war in an internal conflict.37
A. Habeas Corpus and Suspension in Britain up to the War of the American
Revolution
In 1215 King John promised that he would not deprive any freeman of liberty
except with due process or according to the law of the land.38 In 1626 Charles I
needed money to pay for a war but did not want to summon a Parliament to impose
31 Id. at 922.
32 See id. at 998–99.
33 See infra Part V.
34 See Halliday & White, supra note 7, at 697.
35 See Tyler, supra note 3, at 953.
36 Id. at 937.
37 See, e.g., id. at 939.
38 “No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way
ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the
law of the land.” Magna Carta 1215, translated in J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 441, 461 (1992).
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taxes.39 King Charles resorted to mandatory loans and imprisoned five subjects who
refused to pay.40 They sought relief from King’s Bench through the common law
writ used to test the legality of executive detention, habeas corpus.41 In response to
the writ, the jailers said that the prisoners were held by express commandment of the
King.42 King’s Bench remanded the petitioners to custody.43 In 1628, Parliament
addressed the issue of imprisonment at the King’s command with the Petition of
Right.44 The Petition of Right asserted that the subject’s right of personal liberty
operates against the King, who is not allowed to imprison at his discretion.45 Allud-
ing to the forced loan cases, the petition recited that “divers of your subjects have
of late been imprisoned without any cause showed,” and that on habeas “no cause
was certified, but that they were detained by your Majesty’s special command.”46
The Petition, to which Charles gave his assent, asked “that no freeman, in any such
manner as is before mentioned, be imprisoned or detained.”47 The King’s express
command was not a justification for detention, and hence not a good response to the
writ of habeas corpus.48
39 See ROBERTS.WALKER,THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS
CORPUS AS THE WRIT OF LIBERTY 59 (1960).
40 Id. Charles’s desire to raise money without summoning Parliament “was the genesis
of the infamous Forced Loan of 1626.” Id.
41 Id. at 59–60.
42 “The writ issued to the Warden of the Fleet [Prison] who returned that the prisoners
were held per speciale mandatum Domini Regis thereby raising the question of whether the
court would continue to regard this return sufficient at law.” Id. at 60. As Halliday explains,
the question in that case (Darnel’s Case, also called The Five Knights Case) was, “by what law
might one person properly hold another in custody?” HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at 137. The
answer, “‘[B]y his majesty’s special commandment’ . . . was certain. Was it also sufficient?”
Id. (quoting original writs and returns in the British National Archives, KB145/15/3).
43 Darnel’s Case (1627) 3 How. St. Tr. 1, 59 (Eng.). The remand to custody was a procedural
step, and the judges did not say that the King had authority to confine subjects at his discretion.
JAMES S. HART, JR., THE RULE OF LAW, 1603–1660, at 124 (2003). Professor Hart argues
plausibly that Darnel and the other knights were concerned mainly with the legality of the
forced loan, not their imprisonment, and that the return of the writ represented the King’s
counsel’s decision not to put the forced loan directly at issue and instead to use the response
that the petitioners were confined at the express command of the King, which was not itself
an innovation. Id. at 122. As a result, the case came to turn, not on the forced loan, but on “a
much broader issue: the King’s powers of discretionary imprisonment.” Id.
44 Petition of Right 1628, 3 Car. 1 c. 1 (Eng.).
45 Id.
46 Id. § 5. The Petition previously referred to Magna Carta’s requirement that “no Freeman
may be taken or imprisoned or be disseised of his Freehold or Liberties or his free Customes or
be outlawed or exiled or in any manner destroyed, but by the lawfull Judgment of his Peeres
or by the Law of the Land.” Id. § 3 (citing Magna Carta 1225, 9 Hen. 3, M.C. ch. 29).
47 Id. § 8.
48 Id. § 5.
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To say that the Crown could not detain subjects at discretion did not mean that
the Crown could not detain subjects.49 English law provided several grounds on
which individuals might be deprived of personal liberty.50 Perhaps the most important
came from the criminal law.51 Not only could convicts be confined as punishment, but
accused criminals also could be held by the executive pending trial.52 Pretrial detention,
unlike conviction, would not reflect the outcome of a trial.53 Holding accused criminals
before trial thus could be a useful tool for the executive to use against its enemies,
especially if the King’s judges were prepared to delay actual trials.54
In 1679, Parliament adopted the Habeas Corpus Act, also called the Liberty of
the Subject Act.55 The statute regulated pretrial detention on “criminal or supposed
criminal” grounds, and was designed to ensure that defendants would be released on
bail when appropriate and brought to trial promptly.56 Accused criminals committed to
prison were generally entitled to bail unless they were committed for “Treason or
Fellony plainely expressed in the Warrant of Commitment.”57 Accused felons, includ-
ing accused traitors, had to be brought to trial within two terms of court.58 In those
49 See Richard Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25 MICH. L. REV. 24, 26–27 (1926).
50 For example, English law long provided for arrest and imprisonment as part of civil
process and to enforce judgment debts. Id.
51 See, e.g., STUART E. PRALL, THE BLOODLESS REVOLUTION 136–37 (1985).
52 Id.
53 Describing criminal law in the common law courts in the late sixteenth and early seven-
teenth centuries, Holdsworth discussed the availability of arrest warrants on suspicion of treason
or felony, which could come from any source, 5 W.S.HOLDSWORTH,AHISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 191 (1927), the statutes that made bail difficult to obtain, id. at 190–91, and the result
that persons arrested and not bailed would remain in prison until tried, id. at 191. Not only could
suspicion come from private people, it was often based on “common rumor and repute.” 6
JOHN BAKER, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 88–89 (2003).
54 For James II, the criminal law was an important tool with which to damage his enemies,
and common-law and statutory rules of criminal procedure an impediment. According to
Stuart E. Prall:
If those whom James sought to coerce by means of the criminal law had
the statutory right to a writ of habeas corpus and were thus guaranteed a
fair and speedy trial following their arrest, on specific criminal charges,
and then the right to have the case heard before a jury in their own
district, then the king was unable to freely use the criminal law for his
own purposes.
PRALL, supra note 51, at 136–37.
55 See Tyler, supra note 3, at 924.
56 Habeas Corpus Act 1679, 31 Car. 2 c. 2, § 1 (Eng.). The enacting clause noted the “great
delayes” used by jailers to whose custody “any of the Kings Subjects have been committed
for criminall or supposed criminall Matters,” and stated that the statute was enacted “[f]or
the prevention whereof and the more speedy Releife of all persons imprisoned for any such
criminall or supposed criminall Matters.” Id.
57 Id. § 2.
58 Id. § 6.
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respects, the Act protected the substantive right of natural liberty, limiting the circum-
stances and the time in which individuals could be held in prison on criminal grounds.59
To enforce those rules the Act also created a remedy: a specialized statutory
form of the writ of habeas corpus.60 Parliament instructed the courts to keep straight
the common law and statutory writs by endorsing the documents to indicate which
one was involved.61 Like common-law habeas, the statutory version directed the
jailer to justify the petitioner’s detention.62 If the imprisonment was unlawful, the
court could then order the prisoner discharged.63
In 1688, James II fled Britain in face of a rebellion and was replaced by his
nephew, William III, and his nephew’s wife, James’s daughter Mary II.64 The new
Protestant monarchs’ hold on the throne was tenuous, however, with James leading
a military force in Ireland and retaining much support in Britain.65 Under English
law as it then stood, subjects plotting against the monarch almost inevitably commit-
ted some crime, often treason itself.66 The regular criminal process as set out in the
Habeas Corpus Act, however, was not well suited to dealing promptly and preemp-
tively with disloyal subjects.67 Confinement pending trial for treason required sworn
statements in writing and specific identification of the cause of detention, which
might well not be available against careful and dangerous plotters.68 Proving a
59 James II chafed under those restraints and wanted to repeal the Habeas Corpus Act. See
PRALL, supra note 51, at 137.
60 31 Car. 2 c. 2, § 1.
61 Id. § 2. King’s Bench paperwork distinguished between the statutory and common law
writs. “After 1679, the verso of the writ also contains a note about whether the writ issued by
common law or according to the terms of the Habeas Corpus Act.” HALLIDAY, supra note 9,
at 320. One of Halliday’s major findings concerns the continued importance of the common
law writ: “Especially in term, but during vacations too, judges performed their most innovative
work using the common law writ, in part because the statute applied only to imprisonment
for felony or treason.” Id. at 242.
62 31 Car. 2 c. 2, § 2.
63 Id.
64 Clarence C. Crawford, The Suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act and the Revolution
of 1689, 30 ENG. HIST. REV. 613, 616 (1915).
65 Id. (“Ireland was in a state of revolt and the friends of James in Scotland were ready
to take up arms.”).
66 Under the main treason statute, to “compass or imagine” the death of the King (or Queen
in 1689) was treason. Treason Act 1351, 25 Edw. 3 c. 2 (Eng.). Plots to use force to dethrone the
King were likely to fall within that category. For example, according to Hale, concerting a plan
to imprison the King by force would be an overt act by way of compassing the King’s death. 1
MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 109 (Sollom Emlyn, ed., Savoy, E. & R. Nutt & R. Gosling 1736). Compassing the
King’s death “had been used subsequently by English judges to cover written or spoken sub-
versive words and conspiracies to levy war.” BRADLEY CHAPIN, THE AMERICAN LAW OF
TREASON: REVOLUTIONARY AND EARLY NATIONAL ORIGINS 40 (1964).
67 See Crawford, supra note 64, at 613–14.
68 Id.
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conspiracy to dethrone the King and Queen by force was hard, while conspiring was
easy.69
In response, Parliament adopted legislation temporarily authorizing detention
of suspected criminals on terms inconsistent with the Habeas Corpus Act.70 Certain
high officials were empowered to arrest and imprison on the basis of suspicion of high
treason, without the usually requisite specific sworn statements.71 Bail was denied
to those so arrested, and their trials were put off beyond the schedule called for by
the 1679 Act.72 The 1688 statute was the first of what came to be called suspensions
of the Habeas Corpus Act, or suspensions of the habeas corpus, or similar names.73
Like its successors, the first Suspension Act had several noteworthy features.74
First, it expanded the authority of the executive to hold individuals in custody, and
hence contracted the right of natural liberty.75 Second, that expansion conferred wide
discretion to choose whom to commit to prison: suspicion was easily found, and the
Crown could decide which suspects to hold.76 Third, it authorized detention on suspi-
cion of crime, and hence had to override the Habeas Corpus Act, which limited im-
prisonment on criminal or supposed criminal grounds.77 Fourth, commitments were
subject to judicial scrutiny via the writ of habeas corpus, with which the Act did not
interfere.78 Under a suspension act, a proper commitment document would provide
69 See id. at 613–15 (noting the procedure by which a prisoner could gain release through
the writ of habeas corpus).
70 Id. at 619–20.
71 See Habeas Corpus Suspension Act 1688, 1 W. & M. c. 2 (Eng.).
72 Persons committed by the Privy Council for “Suspition of High Treason” were to be held
in “safe Custodie . . . without Baile or Mainprize,” and no “Judge or other Person” was to “Baile
or Try any such Person . . . soe Committed without Order from” the Privy Council. Id. The initial
statute ran for one month, during which trial was deferred. Crawford, supra note 64, at 620, 622.
73 E.g., Crawford, supra note 64, at 613, 629.
74 Professors Halliday and White comprehensively reviewed British suspension statutes,
beginning with the 1688 Act. Halliday & White, supra note 7, at 613–19. As they explain,
Parliament followed a formula, defining “who had special powers to imprison, how that power
might be used, the duration of such powers, and the reversion to normal bail practices thereaf-
ter.” Id. at 617–18. While the Suspension Acts explicitly granted detention authority to the
executive, “[t]he second and most surprising feature is that no statute ever ‘suspended’ ‘habeas
corpus.’ The words ‘habeas corpus’ do not appear in any of them.” Id. at 618. That is because
the statutes gave the executive additional power to detain, thereby making more detention
lawful, and did not restrict the courts’ power to inquire into the lawfulness of detention. “The
suspension statutes expanded one power rather than curtail another. Even during periods of
suspension, the common law writ of habeas corpus never lapsed, even if the Crown received
new capacities to detain accused traitors without trial for carefully limited spells.” Id.
75 See 1 W. & M. c. 2. The Act’s title makes the point: “An Act for Impowering His Majestie
to Apprehend and Detaine such Persons as He shall finde just Cause to Suspect are Conspireing
against the Government.” Id.
76 Id.
77 Compare id., with Habeas Corpus Act 1679, 31 Car. 2 c. 2 (Eng.).
78 1 W. & M. c. 2.
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a good response to the writ by the jailer, but the courts could decide whether there
was such a document.79 Finally, although the 1688 statute was indeed a suspension
of aspects of the Habeas Corpus Act, it did not say that it was suspending anything.80
The 1688 Act was also given a name that would be shortened. The statute was
unofficially called a suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act.81 That name was a good
description, because Parliament had indeed temporarily made important parts of its ear-
lier enactment inoperative.82 The name acquired a short form that was not so
descriptive, however. In Britain, such statutes also came to be called suspensions of the
habeas corpus.83 If the shorter phrase had been taken to mean a suspension of the
79 For example, in 1696, while a suspension statute was in effect, King’s Bench used the
writ to review the confinement of James Hunt, who had been committed by a Justice of the
Peace for corresponding with France. HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at 249. Justices of the Peace
were not empowered to commit suspects under the Suspension Act, and Hunt was bailed. Id.
Mansfield would later use the writ to determine whether a suspect committed under the
Revolutionary War suspension fell within the Act. ANARGUMENT IN THE CASE OF EBENEZER
SMITH PLATT 11–12 (London, G. Kearsly 1777) [hereinafter Mansfield] (Lord Mansfield
issued the opinion of the bench.).
80 The statute did refer to the 1679 Act, but not by saying that the earlier Act was sus-
pended. The 1688 Act provided that after it expired the persons committed under it were to
have “the Benefit and Advantage” of the 1679 Act and other laws and statutes “relateing to
or provideing for the Liberty of the Subjects of this Realme.” 1 W. & M. c. 2.
81 Referring to the various statutes in which Parliament had forbidden bail or trial according
to the Habeas Corpus Act, Mansfield is reported to have said from the bench in 1777, “from
the Effect that they had, though not in the Title, nor by any Words in any one of them, have
always been called Suspensions of the Habeas Corpus Act.” Mansfield, supra note 79, at 12.
When Lord North’s suspension statute was introduced in the House of Commons in 1777,
the running head in the Parliamentary History was “Debate in the Commons on the Bill for
suspending the Habeas Corpus Act.” 19 THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, FROM
THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE YEAR 1803, at 3–6 (London, T.C. Hansard 1814) [hereinafter
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY].
82 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
83 Reporting on the introduction of Lord North’s Suspension Act of 1777, the London
Evening Post stated that the Act would “suspend the Habeas Corpus act” in the cases described.
House of Commons, LONDONEVENING POST, Feb. 6–8, 1777, at 3. A week later, the same news-
paper argued that in the past “the suspension of the Habeas Corpus” had been undertaken
“when the person of the King, the laws and religion of the country were in the most imminent
danger” which was not the case at that point. Postscript, LONDON EVENING POST, Feb. 13–15,
1777, at 4. That paper used the terms interchangeably. That month, another London newspaper
reported the capture of the American General Lee and thought it likely that he would be the first
person executed under the new Act for the suspension of the habeas corpus. DAILYADVERTISER
(London), Feb. 13, 1777, at 1. Lee was eventually treated as a prisoner of war and exchanged.
See Jared Sparks et al., Report on Exchange of Prisoners During the American Revolution,
in 5 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 325, 332 (Boston, John
Wilson & Son 1862). A similar shortened form appeared in another London paper in 1778,
which called the most recent renewal of the Suspension Act “the American Habeas Corpus
Suspension Bill.” PUB. ADVERTISER (London), Dec. 9, 1778, at 2.
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writ, it would have been inaccurate.84 Suspensions did not interfere with the writ, but
with other aspects of the Liberty of the Subject Act.85 I have not encountered any
British usage, however, in which the error is to be found. Every instance with which
I am familiar in which “suspension of the habeas corpus” and similar phrases were
used is a reference to the kind of statute called, at greater length, a suspension of the
Habeas Corpus Act.86 Suspensions of the Habeas Corpus Act authorized detention
on criminal accusations, but on grounds, and for lengths of time, that would have
violated that Act absent contrary legislation.87
In 1715, Parliament acted against a planned rebellion by supporters of the House
of Stuart directed against the Hanoverian succession.88 Because of the Acts of Union
of 1706 and 1707, the Parliament of Great Britain was then legislating for both England
and Scotland.89 That Parliament adopted legislation closely based on the 1688 statute,
legislation that authorized detention and barred trial or release by the courts.90 By doing
so, the statute suspended the English Habeas Corpus Act, though not in so many
words.91 The 1715 statute did, however, say that it was suspending something: the Scot-
tish 1701 Act for Preventing Wrongous Imprisonment.92 The Scottish statute resembled
the English Liberty of the Subject Act in several important respects.93 It required that
commitment warrants express the “particular cause” of commitment, that bail be avail-
able for bailable offenses, and that the accused be promptly tried.94 The Scottish statute
was not a habeas corpus act, however, because the Scottish courts did not use habeas
corpus.95 Instead, criminal detainees could make an application to an appropriate
84 See Suspensions of Habeas Corpus Acts 1688, 1 W. & M. cc. 2, 7 (Eng.) (allowing for
the indefinite detention of suspected individuals rather than a suspension of the writ).
85 See id.
86 See, e.g., HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at 248.
87 See 1 W. & M. c. 7 (allowing indefinite detention of individuals “for Suspicion of High
Treason or Treasonable Practices or by Warrant . . . for such Causes aforesaid”).
88 See Tyler, supra note 3, at 943.
89 Union with Scotland Act 1706, 6 Ann. c. 11 (Eng.) (English Act for union with Scotland);
Union with England Act 1707, (RPS) 1706/10/257 (Scot.) (Scottish Act for union with England).
90 Compare Habeas Corpus Suspension Act 1715, 1 Geo. 1 stat. 2 c. 8 (Gr. Brit.), reprinted
in THE ANNALS OF KING GEORGE, YEAR THE FIRST (London 1716), with 1 W. & M. cc. 2, 7.
91 The 1715 statute provided for detention on suspicion of treasonable practices and not
just treason. 1 Geo. 1 stat. 2 c. 8.
92 The 1715 Suspension Act provided:
That the Act made in Scotland in the Year of our Lord One Thousand
Seven Hundred and One, intituled, An Act for preventing wrongous Im-
prisonment, and against undue Delays in Trials, until the said Four and
Twentieth Day of January, in the Year of our Lord One Thousand Seven
Hundred and Fifteen, be suspended as to all Cases of Treason and Sus-
picion of Treason.
Id.
93 See Criminal Procedure Act 1701, (RPS) 1700/10/234 (Scot.).
94 Id.
95 See id.
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judicial officer that was the functional equivalent of a petition for the writ, and the
courts could then inquire into the lawfulness of detention and order release if ap-
propriate.96 No writ of habeas corpus was involved, however, so the Scottish statute
did not mention it.97
The first suspension that used a cognate of “suspend” thus did not suspend
habeas corpus, or the writ of habeas corpus, or the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.98 It temporarily displaced two statutes, one English and one Scottish, that
limited the Crown’s authority to detain on criminal grounds.99
The limited scope of the Habeas Corpus Act and statutes suspending it, and the
highly specific meaning of suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act and related phrases,
were on display in an important legal debate in 1758.100 In 1756, at the outset of what
became the Seven Years War, Parliament passed a statute providing for involuntary
military service.101 Such statutes were called Recruiting Acts, or more pejoratively
Impressment Acts or Press Acts.102 Under them, subjects liable to be drafted were
taken into custody.103 Before being assigned to a regiment they were usually held at
the Savoy Prison.104 Statutes of that kind provided for executive detention for reasons
of national security.105 They were not called suspensions of the Habeas Corpus Act,
or suspensions of the habeas corpus, or anything similar.106
That usage is instructive, but it should not be surprising. Detention at the
beginning of involuntary military service is not detention on criminal or supposed
criminal grounds, and so was not regulated by the Habeas Corpus Act.107 Rather, the
limits on the Crown’s detention authority came from the recruiting statutes them-
selves, which drafted only carefully identified categories of subjects.108 As would
96 Id.
97 See id.
98 See 1 Geo. 1 c. 8.
99 Because the 1715 statute referred to the Scottish statute generally, it is possible that it
blocked the courts from inquiring into the lawfulness of detention through the Scottish
equivalent of habeas corpus. See id.
100 See generally Kevin Costello, Habeas Corpus and Military and Naval Impressment,
1756–1816, 29 J. LEG. HIST. 215, 218–24 (2008) (discussing the 1758 debate in the House
of Commons and House of Lords).
101 Id. at 216; see also Recruiting Act 1756, 29 Geo. 2 c. 4 (Gr. Brit.).
102 Costello, supra note 100, at 215–16 (referring to Recruiting Act of 1703 and Recruiting
Act of 1756); see also 15 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 81, at 891 (unidentified
participants in debate referring to the “Press Act” and “Recruiting Act”).
103 Costello, supra note 100, at 218.
104 Id. at 218 n.19.
105 See, e.g., id. (indicating a rise in impressment during times of war).
106 See, e.g., supra note 102 and accompanying text.
107 See Costello, supra note 100, at 218 n.19.
108 The draft was limited to men who “d[id] not follow or exercise any lawful calling or
employment, or have not some other lawful and sufficient support.” Subjects entitled to vote
for members of the House of Commons were specifically exempt from the draft. Recruiting
Act 1756, 29 Geo. 2 c. 4 (Gr. Brit.).
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be expected, subjects who claimed that they had been unlawfully taken in the draft
sought judicial relief through the common law writ of habeas corpus.109
Soon after enforcement of the Recruiting Act of 1756 began, challenges to
detention under it came before King’s Bench.110 Led by their new Chief Justice,
Lord Mansfield, the judges devised a procedure that they believed would be better
than habeas corpus.111 Instead of issuing the writ, King’s Bench would issue a rule
directed to the recruiting commissioner, ordering him to show cause why the prisoner
should not be discharged from the service.112 The judges thought that the rule had
several advantages over the writ.113 First, unlike habeas corpus, it did not require that
the petitioner be brought before the court in person.114 Second, it avoided the long-
standing question whether, and to what extent, the court in habeas could look behind
the factual allegations made in the return of the writ.115 Third, because the ultimate
remedy was an order requiring discharge from the service and not just from custody,
the rule ensured that successful petitioners could not be punished for desertion.116
King’s Bench adopted the new procedure in 1757.117 In early 1758, Sir Charles
Pratt, Attorney General and a member of the House of Commons, introduced a bill that
would have replaced the new show-cause procedure with another statutory version of
habeas corpus, in addition to that created by the Habeas Corpus Act.118 The bill, which
Pratt may have introduced in part as an attack on Mansfield, passed the House of Com-
mons in April 1758.119 It was subject to heavy criticism in the House of Lords, includ-
ing by Mansfield, and rejected.120 The upper house then asked the common law judges
to draft a bill that would improve habeas procedure in impressment cases but would
not have the many problems identified in Pratt’s initial draft.121 Habeas reform based
on the judges’ proposal was eventually adopted in 1816.122
109 As Costello explains, habeas was regularly used by petitioners who claimed to have been
wrongfully detained under a Recruiting Act like those of 1703 and 1756. Costello, supra note
100, at 215–16.
110 Id. at 216.
111 See id. at 216–18.
112 Id. at 216–17.
113 Id. at 217.
114 Id.
115 In the show-cause proceeding, the court would decide on the basis of affidavits, not just
the petition for habeas corpus and the jailer’s return of the writ. Id. at 217–18.
116 Absent an order of discharge, “[i]t was conceivable that one could be released from the
Savoy [Prison], then shot for desertion.” HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at 114.
117 Costello, supra note 100, at 216–17.
118 Id. at 218–19, 221.
119 Id. at 219–22.
120 Id. at 222–24, 233.
121 Id. at 233.
122 Id. at 249. The final version of the bill was adopted as Habeas Corpus Act 1816, 56
Geo. 3 c. 100 (UK).
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Throughout the debates in both houses in 1758, it was clear that the statutory writ
of habeas corpus created by the 1679 Act did not extend to allegedly illegal impress-
ment, because involuntarily recruited soldiers were detained, but not on criminal or
supposed criminal grounds.123 According to the Parliamentary History, one argument
in favor of the bill was that the statutory form of the writ was much superior to the
common law form, but only the latter was available to impressed soldiers.124 More
striking, and clearer in both its content and attribution, was the response given by the
common-law judges to the House of Lords as to an important technical question.125
Much of the debate concerned the relative merits of the common-law writ and the
statutory writ.126 For that reason, the scope of the latter was an important question.127
The Lords, using their privilege to consult the judges, asked them whether:
[T]he said statute of the 31st of king Charles 2, and the several
provisions therein made for the immediate awarding and returning
the writ of Habeas Corpus, do not extend to the case of any man
compelled against his will, in time of peace, either into the land or
sea service, without any colour of legal authority; or to any cases
of imprisonment, detainer or restraint whatsoever, except cases
of commitment for criminal or supposed criminal matters.128
123 See 15 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 81, at 876 (raising this argument in the
House of Commons). See generally Costello, supra note 100 (discussing the debates in both
Houses).
124 The account of the debates that appears in the Parliamentary History, generally drawn
from journalistic sources, does not always identify the speaker. See generally 15 PARLIAMEN-
TARY HISTORY, supra note 81. A member of the House of Commons is said to have argued
that “the benefit of the Habeas Corpus Act” should be extended “to impressed persons.” Id.
at 833. The speaker maintained that under the “legal and equitable construction” of the 1679
statute impressed persons were entitled to its benefits, but that as there were doubts about that
interpretation, the Act should be “explained by public authority” to include impressment. Id.
The problem was that “the Press Act has created a legal cause of imprisonment, which did not
exist before.” Id. at 884. Impressed subjects were “within the mischief intended to be redressed
by [the Habeas Corpus Act]” and should “have the most speedy opportunity of pleading their
claim to liberty.” Id. The subject of debate was the writ of habeas corpus and the contrast
between the statutory and common law versions of that remedy. Id. While the speaker argued
that the 1679 Act properly should be interpreted as applying to impressment, he almost
certainly meant the remedy and not the substantive restrictions on the Crown’s criminal
detention authority. The Crown did not have to bring lawfully impressed soldiers and sailors
to trial in a specified period of time. See id. at 833.
125 See id. at 898–919 (detailing a series of questions put to the judges by the Lords and
their answers).
126 See id. at 898–902.
127 See Costello, supra note 100, at 229 (describing debate about differences between
common law and statutory habeas).
128 15 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 81, at 917.
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Nine of the eleven judges provided answers to the Lords’ questions, and they
all gave substantially the same response to the question about statutory habeas for
impressed subjects.129 Typical was the answer of Sir John Willes, Chief Justice of
the Common Pleas:
That the words of the statute of the 31st Car. 2, and the several
provisions therein made for the immediate awarding and return-
ing the writ of Habeas Corpus, do not extend to the case of any
man compelled against his will, in time of peace, either into the
land or sea service, without any colour of legal authority; nor to
any case of imprisonment, detainer, or restraint, except cases of
commitment for criminal or supposed criminal matters.130
The debate in Parliament in 1758 underlined two related points, one about substance
and the other about terminology. First, some, but only some, of the British law
protecting personal liberty was found in the Habeas Corpus Act.131 The principle that
the Crown could not detain at pleasure was found in the common law, restated in the
Petition of Right.132 The restrictions on involuntary detention of drafted soldiers
were found in the Recruiting Acts themselves.133 Those statutes gave only limited
authority to hold draftees in custody.134 The courts enforced those limits, but not
through the statutory writ of habeas corpus created by the 1679 Act.135 Second, the
terminology reflected the limited scope of the 1679 statute.136 Statutes that expanded
the Crown’s authority to detain on criminal grounds beyond what was permitted by
the earlier Act were called suspensions of it.137 That was natural enough, because
they displaced the limits the 1679 Act imposed.138 Statutes that expanded the
Crown’s authority to detain on noncriminal grounds were called something else, like
Recruiting Acts.139
129 Id. at 904–18.
130 Id. at 918. To the same effect were the answers of Justice Noel, id. at 904, Justice Wilmot,
id. at 906, Justice Bathurst, id. at 908, Baron Adams, id. at 909, Baron Smythe, id. at 911, Baron
Legge, id. at 912, Justice Clive, id. at 914, Justice Dennison, id. at 915, and Chief Baron
Parker, id. at 917. Sir Michael Foster of King’s Bench and Chief Justice Mansfield did not
provide opinions.
131 Id. at 921.
132 Id. at 877.
133 Id. at 891.
134 Id.
135 Id. The common law writ was the generic means by which the legality of detention was
determined. More specific procedures, like the statutory writ and the common law order to
show cause in military recruitment, could replace it. See id.
136 Id. at 876.
137 Id. at 895–96 (bemoaning the ease with which habeas corpus could be suspended).
138 Id. at 890 (arguing that suspension should be reserved only for legal exemptions).
139 See id. at 891.
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B. British Suspension During the War of the American Revolution
British practice in the War of the American Revolution confirms that in British
usage suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act meant statutes that provided for impris-
onment on criminal or supposed criminal grounds that were not consistent with the
Act’s requirements. Early in the conflict, Parliament adopted legislation that provided
for indefinite criminal detention of certain Americans.140 That legislation was called
a suspension.141 In 1782, Parliament adopted another statute specifically authorizing the
Crown to treat detainees under the existing Suspension Acts as prisoners of war and to
exchange them as such, without regard to their confinement on accusation or suspicion
of crime.142 The 1782 statute was not referred to as a suspension.143 This reinforces the
conclusion that suspension consisted only of legislation authorizing detention on crimi-
nal or supposed criminal grounds.144 Just as a military draft did not come within the
British concept of suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act, neither did legislation provid-
ing for holding prisoners of war, including prisoners of war in an internal conflict.145
In 1775, war broke out between King George and his subjects in North America.146
In response to acts of armed hostility by the rebels, the King and Parliament em-
ployed the tools of war in a domestic conflict.147 The King proclaimed a rebellion.148
Two of his officials imposed martial law.149 Parliament made American vessels
140 Treason Act 1777, 17 Geo. 3 c. 9 (Gr. Brit.).
141 Id.




146 See George III, Proclamation of Rebellion (Aug. 23, 1775), reprinted in 1 SOURCE
BOOK OF AMERICAN HISTORY 1606–1926, at 189 (William MacDonald ed., 3d ed. 1926).
147 See id.
148 See id. at 189–90. King George did not limit his efforts to ordinary law enforcement.
He directed his officers, “civil and military,” to take steps necessary to end the rebellion and
bring the traitors to justice. Id. at 189.
149 On June 12, 1775, General Thomas Gage, Royal Governor of Massachusetts, issued a
proclamation explaining that “justice cannot be administered by the common law of the land,”
and he therefore ordered “the use and exercise of the Law-Martial, within and throughout this
Province for so long time as the present unhappy occasion shall necessarily require.” Thomas
Gage, Proclamation of June 12, 1775, reprinted in 2 AMERICAN ARCHIVES: FOURTH SERIES
970 (Peter Force ed., Washington, M. St. Clair Clarke & Peter Force 1839). On November 7,
1775, the Royal Governor of Virginia, the Earl of Dunmore, proclaimed that:
I do in Virtue of the Power and Authority to ME given, by His MAJ-
ESTY, determine to execute Martial Law, and cause the same to be
executed throughout this Colony: and to the end that Peace and good
Order may the sooner be restored, I do require every Person capable of
bearing Arms, to resort to His MAJESTY’S STANDARD, or be looked
upon as Traitors to His MAJESTY’S Crown and Government . . . .
Lord Dunmore, Proclamation of Nov. 12, 1775, reprinted in AFRICAN AMERICAN VOICES:
A DOCUMENTARY READER, 1619–1877, at 78–79 (Steven Mintz ed., 4th ed. 2009).
2021] HABEAS CORPUS SUSPENSION CLAUSE 665
lawful prize, treating them like the shipping of enemies in an international war.150
From early in the conflict, rebel soldiers in North America were treated as prisoners of
war.151 They were detained, paroled, and exchanged.152 In keeping with the domestic
nature of the conflict, the King’s officials sought to manage prisoner exchanges
without taking any step that would treat the rebel governments as sovereign.153
While American soldiers were treated as prisoners of war, and not charged with
treason, rebel sailors seeking prizes posed a different problem.154 They threatened
150 In December 1775, Parliament adopted the American Prohibitory Act, which stated
that many Americans were in “open rebellion,” having “assembled together an armed force,
engaged his Majesty’s troops, and attacked his forts.” American Prohibitory Act 1776, 16
Geo. 3 c. 5, § 1 (Gr. Brit.). The Act interdicted the colonies’ trade, providing that “all manner
of trade and commerce is and shall be prohibited with” the states listed by name. Id. To
enforce that restriction it declared all vessels engaged in that trade “forfeited to his Majesty,
as if the same were the ships and effects of open enemies.” Id. As in international wars, the
Royal Navy was authorized to take American shipping as prize. Id. § 3.
151 See LARRY G. BOWMAN, CAPTIVE AMERICANS: PRISONERS DURING THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 6 (1976).
152 When fighting began in 1775, Americans were taken prisoner at Bunker Hill and in a
failed invasion of Quebec. Id. Although the British regarded the Americans as rebels, they did
not prosecute military captives for treason or some other criminal offense such as insurrection.
Id. at 131. “[T]he British government chose to deal with the captives as if they were pris-
oners of war without officially declaring them such until the last year of the conflict.” Id.
The British ministry addressed the question of POW status for Americans in a high-
profile case involving American General Charles Lee, who was captured by the British in
December 1776. Sparks et al., supra note 83, at 332 (report by Massachusetts Historical
Society committee about holding citizens as prisoners of war in the Civil War, a committee
that included leading historian Jared Sparks and also George Ticknor Curtis and Edward
Everett). Lee previously had served in the British Royal Army and had retired. Id. British
commander Sir William Howe believed that as an officer of the King on the retired list, Lee
was a deserter subject to military justice. Id. When General Washington learned that Lee was
held as a deserter, he threatened reprisals against British and Hessian officers captured by
the Americans, and offered to make an exchange for Lee. Id. When Howe sought instructions
from Colonial Secretary George Germain, Germain replied, “His majesty consents that Lee
(having been struck off the half-pay list) shall, though deserving the most exemplary punishment,
be deemed a prisoner of war; and may be exchanged as such, when you may think proper.” Id.
at 336–37 (quoting Letter from Lord George Germain to Sir William Howe (Sept. 3, 1777)).
153 According to Bowman:
Exchanges were to be negotiated by the British military commanders
in whatever fashion they deemed proper. The negotiations which pre-
ceeded an exchange were to be conducted in a manner which pledged
the honor of the commander, and not the government, that the bargain
would be consumated. Until the end of the war, the exchanges were partial
in character, and they were, in effect, a series of gentlemen’s agreements
which were never elevated to the status of a treaty.
BOWMAN, supra note 151, at 104.
154 Letter from Lord George Germain to Lord Mansfield (Aug. 6, 1776), in 12 DOCUMENTS
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1770–1783, at 177 (K.G. Davies ed., 1976) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION].
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British shipping and gave rise to demands from merchants that steps be taken to stop
them.155 If American sailors were prosecuted for piracy or treason while the conflict
was ongoing, however, the Americans would retaliate against British prisoners in
their hands.156 The British ministry thus wanted to be able to hold Americans on
criminal charges, so as to create a deterrent to prize-taking, without bringing them to
trial on the timetable required by the Habeas Corpus Act.157 A suspension statute 
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 The problem of rebel sailors came to the ministry’s attention in July 1776, when several
American privateers were brought into port in London as prisoners. Id. at 176. Colonial Secretary
Germain was unsure whether to charge them with piracy and possibly treason or hold them as
POWs and return them to North America for exchange. Id. at 176–77. Seeking private advice
from Chief Justice Mansfield, Germain explained that the case for deterring American sailors
with the threat of prosecution was stronger than that with respect to soldiers. Id. at 177. The
lure of prizes gave sailors incentives that soldiers, facing low pay and danger, lacked. Id. While
Americans fighting on land with little pay faced discouraging prospects, sailors taking unarmed
vessels as prizes could “acquire according to their ideas immense fortunes” at little personal
risk. Id. As Germain recognized, immediate criminal prosecution almost certainly would lead
to retaliation by the Americans against British prisoners in their hands. Id. at 176–77. Mansfield
advised that the ministry temporize, not charging the Americans with treason or piracy for fear
of retaliation, but holding them without saying they were prisoners of war. Letter from Lord
Mansfield to Lord George Germain (Aug. 8, 1776), in 12 DOCUMENTS OF THE AMERICANREVO-
LUTION, supra note 154, at 180. Only if the Americans sought relief through habeas corpus
should they be committed on criminal charges. Id. Although Mansfield did not mention suspen-
sion legislation, suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act was a natural solution to the problem:
under a suspension statute, captive Americans could be held indefinitely on criminal charges
without being brought to a trial that would provoke retaliation. See id. at 179–80. They could
thus be credibly threatened with eventual criminal prosecution while being held as de facto
POWs during the conflict. A few months later, Lord North introduced suspension legislation.
See 19 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 81, at 13. He did not say that sailors were the
reason; neither did he say that only with suspension in effect could Americans be held as
prisoners of war. Id.
In his letter to Germain, Mansfield recommended that the Americans be held as prisoners
of war for the time being. Letter from Lord Mansfield to Lord George Germain, supra, at
183–84. He went on to write, “If these 4 are so wickedly advised as to claim to be considered
as subjects and apply for a habeas corpus, it is their own doing; they force a regular commit-
ment for their crime.” Id. at 180. That passage may seem to imply that he thought that subjects
could not be held as POWs and that by claiming to be treated as subjects the Americans would
be pointing that out. Id. That inference is not correct. Mansfield almost certainly believed that
subjects could be held as POWs, provided they were rebels. See MATTHEW HALE,THE PRER-
OGATIVES OF THE KING 122–23 (D.C.E. Yale ed., 1976). Rebellion put rebels out of the King’s
protection, making them domestic enemies. See id. (discussing war between the King and
his own subjects in rebellion). As such, they shared some of the burdens and benefits of foreign
enemies. One burden was that enemies, foreign or domestic, were not proper parties in the
King’s courts, which were open only to persons within his protection. See Sparenburgh v.
Bannatyne (1797) 126 Eng. Rep. 837, 841; 1 Bos. & Pul. 163, 170 (Eyre, C.J.) (stating that
neither foreign enemies nor subjects who refuse to submit to the law are proper parties); Mrs.
Alexander’s Cotton, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 404, 419 (1865) (following a principle of public law,
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was the natural solution, and a few months after the problem of American sailors be-
came acute, Prime Minister North proposed and Parliament adopted suspension legisla-
tion.158 It was renewed throughout the war.159 Soldiers in North American continued
to be treated as prisoners of war and were not committed on criminal charges pursuant
to the Suspension Act.160 Sailors held in Great Britain were so committed.161
Likewise committed on criminal charges under the suspension statutes were a
small number of civilians, including one of special importance: Henry Laurens of South
Carolina.162 After serving as President of the Continental Congress, Laurens was
sent on a diplomatic mission to the Netherlands in August 1780.163 Laurens’s vessel
was captured by the Royal Navy off Newfoundland on September 3.164 He was taken
to London, where he arrived on October 5.165 Laurens was promptly committed to
the Tower of London on charges of treason under the Suspension Act.166
applicable in civil and international wars, that residents of areas in insurrection are public
enemies who may not sue in the sovereign’s courts). Rebels therefore were not proper parties
to seek any remedy, including habeas. A benefit of enemy status was that enemies had bellig-
erent privilege. Acts of hostility against lawful targets were not crimes. See, e.g., Ford v. Surget,
97 U.S. 594, 605 (1878) (stating that Confederate armies were accorded the privileges of
belligerents). Domestic enemies differed from foreign enemies in that they still owed allegiance,
so their acts of hostility were treason. But those acts were not murder or piracy. Had the
Americans claimed to be treated as subjects by petitioning for habeas, they would have been
disclaiming their status as enemies. See Letter from Lord Mansfield to Lord George Germain,
supra, at 180. (As far as the Americans were concerned, they were foreign enemies, if they
knew about American claims of independence.) If the American sailors were not enemies,
they were pirates. Id. Advice telling them to disclaim a defense against capital charges would
indeed have been wicked. Had they disclaimed the status of domestic enemy by petitioning
for habeas, they would have been properly transferred from POW status to detention on charges
of piracy. By advising Germain that the Americans be held as POWs pending any habeas pe-
tition, Mansfield was not encouraging the executive to act lawlessly. Id. Germain could properly
assume that subjects taken in arms were domestic enemies, not within the King’s protection
and liable to be detained under the law of war. See id. If they rejected that status, the resulting
prosecutions for piracy were, as Mansfield wrote, “their own doing.” Id.
158 Habeas Corpus Suspension Act 1776, 17 Geo. 3 c. 9 (Gr. Brit.).
159 The initial suspension act and its extensions ran from February 20, 1777, to January 1,
1783. Id.; Habeas Corpus Suspension Act 1778, 18 Geo. 3 c. 1 (Gr. Brit.); Habeas Corpus Sus-
pension Act 1779, 19 Geo. 3 c. 1 (Gr. Brit.); Continuance of Acts Act 20 Geo. 3 c. 5 (Gr. Brit.);
Habeas Corpus Suspension Act 1781, 21 Geo. 3 c. 2 (Gr. Brit.); Habeas Corpus Suspension
Act 1782, 22 Geo. 3 c. 1 (Gr. Brit.). When the final extension expired, the provisional articles
of peace had been subscribed. They provided that all prisoners were to “be set at liberty.”
Provisional Articles art. VII, 8 Stat. 54 (1782).
160 Sparks et al., supra note 83, at 338.
161 BOWMAN, supra note 151, at 131 (stating that American sailors captured in European
and African waters were taken to Mill and Forton prisons in Britain).
162 DAVID DUNCAN WALLACE, THE LIFE OF HENRY LAURENS 358 (1915).
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 363.
166 Id.
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The British government’s decision to treat Laurens as an accused traitor by com-
mitting him under the suspension statute outraged the American Congress, which
in response demanded that General Burgoyne return to captivity in America pursu-
ant to the parole he had given after the British defeat at Saratoga.167 Laurens’s
situation also disturbed British opponents of the administration, notably Edmund
Burke.168 A solution in which Laurens would be treated simply as a prisoner of war
and exchanged, possibly for Burgoyne, was subject to the legal objection that
Laurens had been committed for high treason and could not be discharged without
being tried or pardoned.169 That limitation on the Crown’s options came from the use
of the suspension statute.170 A trial was out of the question, because of the American
167 RICHARD J. HARGROVE, JR., GENERAL JOHN BURGOYNE 233 (1983). Burgoyne had
returned to England upon giving a parole that required him to come back to America on demand
of Congress. Id. at 215. On April 3, 1781, Congress instructed General Washington to recall
Burgoyne and all other officers absent on parole. Resolution of Apr. 3, 1781, reprinted in 19
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 345 (1912). In the Journal the
resolution has a struck-out clause reading, “unless the Honorable Henry Laurens, Esqr., be also
enlarged on his parole.” Id. Laurens was clearly the occasion for the recall, but Congress
apparently decided not to make it explicitly conditional on his release from confinement.
Washington wrote to British commander Sir Henry Clinton demanding that Burgoyne return
pursuant to this parole. See Letter from George Washington to Sir Henry Clinton (Apr. 16,
1781), in 21 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 464 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1937). He
withdrew the demand for Burgoyne’s return shortly thereafter, see Letter from George
Washington to Sir Henry Clinton (May 1, 1781), in 21 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHING-
TON, supra, at 20, but the possibility of its renewal remained a threat as long as Laurens was
confined. The American reaction to treason charges against Laurens, without any prospect
of imminent prosecution because of the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act’s speedy trial
requirement, suggests that even more severe retaliation would have followed had he actually
been put to trial, let alone convicted or worse yet punished.
168 “In August, 1781, Edmund Burke took up Laurens’s case, nor did his interest flag until
the prisoner’s release.” WALLACE, supra note 162, at 383.
169 Burke discussed the situation in a letter of December 2, 1781, to James Bourdieu. See
Letter from Edmund Burke to James Bourdieu (Dec. 2, 1781), in 4 THE CORRESPONDENCE
OF EDMUND BURKE 383–85 (John A. Woods ed., 1963). Burke explained that he had consulted
a politically sophisticated lawyer friend of his, who stated that “it was not in the power of
Ministers to exchange, as a prisoner of War, a person committed on the Ground on which Mr
Laurens was committed.” Id. at 384. The warrant committing Laurens to the Tower under
the Suspension Act stated that he had been charged with high treason and was to be held “until
he shall be delivered by due Course of Law.” David Viscount Stormont & Wills Earl of
Hillsborough, Warrant of Commitment, in 15 THE PAPERS OF HENRY LAURENS 617 (David
R. Chesnutt & C. James Taylor eds., 2000). Burke also believed that the ministers were pleased
with the possibility that Congress would demand that Burgoyne return to America, as they
had come to detest the returned general. Letter from Edmund Burke to James Bourdieu, supra,
at 384 (stating that ministers wished to keep Laurens and force Burgoyne to return to America).
Burgoyne had sought to pin the blame for the defeat at Saratoga on orders he had received
from London. HARGROVE, supra note 167, at 224–25. At one point Burgoyne, who was an
M.P., nearly came to blows in the House of Commons with Secretary of State Germain. Id.
170 Letter from Edmund Burke to James Bourdieu, supra note 169, at 384.
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threat of retaliation.171 Laurens refused to accept a pardon, believing that he was no
traitor because he was no subject of the King.172
On December 17, 1781, Burke told the House of Commons that he intended to
seek its leave to introduce a bill “relative to the exchange of prisoners of war; and to
obviate a difficulty, in the Act for the suspension of the Habeas Corpus, which was at
once disgraceful and inconvenient to the government of this country.”173 That was the
origin of the 1782 statute allowing the King to treat prisoners committed under the
suspension as prisoners of war, and exchange them without regard to the terms of
their commitment.174
That statute empowered the King to hold and exchange rebellious subjects as
“prisoners of war.”175 It endorsed the existing practice of detaining Americans purely
171 Letter from Lord George Germain to Lord Mansfield, supra note 154, at 177.
172 Among [Burke’s] plans suggested was a pardon, but Laurens answered
Burke in December that he would not connive at or benefit by even a
secret or unsolicited pardon, as it would be an implied confession of
guilt, place him under obligations to the King, and make him an object
of contempt in both countries.
WALLACE, supra note 162, at 383. Once the British government began to exchange sailors
held under the Suspension Act, it obtained the King’s pardon before releasing them. SHELDON
S. COHEN, YANKEE SAILORS IN BRITISH GAOLS: PRISONERS OF WAR AT FORTON AND MILL,
1777–1783,at 135(1995).Reports indicate that upon being told they had received his Majesty’s
most gracious pardon, some of the American sailors suggested what King George might do
with it. Id. at 135–36.
173 22 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 81, at 853 (referring to suspension statute
as a “suspension of the Habeas Corpus”). Burke quickly went on to explain that one leading
reason for his planned bill was Laurens. Id. On December 20, 1781, Burke presented to the
Commons a petition from Laurens complaining of his treatment in the Tower. Id. at 874. In
response, Lord North defended the decision to hold Laurens “as a prisoner of state, instead
of a prisoner of war.” Id. at 877. “Mr. Laurens was confined from the requisition of law and
circumstances.” Id. The Solicitor General, James Mansfield, then commented that it was wise
to confine Laurens under the suspension, because otherwise he would long since have been
released: “Policy, law, and justice united in confining Mr. Laurens as a prisoner of state, and
not a prisoner of war.” Id. It may seem that Mansfield meant that if not committed under the
suspension statute Laurens could not have been held as a prisoner of war at all, and so would
have been released, but that is unlikely. Mansfield probably thought that Laurens, if held as
a prisoner of war, would have been exchanged promptly. That is what Burke thought; in a
December 16, 1781 letter to Bourdieu he complained about the Suspension Act, which he
disliked, “under which American prisoners who would have been exchanged on the other side
of the water as prisoners of war have been confined in great Britain as criminals.” Letter from
Edmund Burke to James Bourdieu (Dec. 16, 1781), in 4 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF EDMUND
BURKE, supra note 169, at 393. If Solicitor General Mansfield had thought that the Crown lacked
authority to hold Americans as POWs, he probably would have said that Laurens never would
have been detained in the first place without the suspension statute, or never would have been
brought to Great Britain.
174 22 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 81, at 853.
175 The statute stated:
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criminal charges.181 Nor was it referred to as a suspension of habeas corpus, the Act,
or the writ.182 Burke could not have understood it as a suspension in any sense. He
intensely disliked the Suspension Acts, and his thinking distinguished sharply between
holding Americans as accused or suspected criminals under a suspension and
holding them as prisoners of war.183 A few days before he announced in Parliament
that he would introduce the POW exchange bill, Burke described his plans and his
thoughts in a letter to a friend.184 He said that the idea of legislative authorization for
the exchange originated with Laurens himself.185 Laurens’s suggestion, wrote Burke:
[C]oincided very much with my Notions at a time when I retired
from parliamentary Attendance upon the agitation of that un-
fortunate bill under which American prisoners who would have
been exchanged on the other side of the water as prisoners of war
have been confined in great Britain as criminals. I shall give notice
of my intention to move for such a bill after the holydays.186
In Burke’s view, holding and exchanging Americans as prisoners of war were quite dif-
ferent from, and much better than, holding them as criminals under a suspension of the
Habeas Corpus Act.187 He could not have regarded his legislation authorizing the
181 Id.
182 See id.
183 Letter from Edmund Burke to James Bourdieu, supra note 173, at 390–93.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 393.
186 Id. at 393 (describing opposition to Suspension Act).
187 Introducing the bill on December 17, 1781, Burke explained that holding Americans
as prisoners of war was more humane than confining them on criminal charges. 22 PARLIA-
MENTARY HISTORY, supra note 81, at 855. Ethan Allen, Burke said, “had been brought to
England in irons; but he was sent back without irons, and exchanged in America.” Id. His bill
would “render the prisoners of war taken by this country certain of having the severity of their
fate softened, and made somewhat tolerable, by that tender and mild treatment which all civilized
belligerent powers made the rule of their conduct during a time of hostility.” Id. at 857. In
November 1777, when he spoke against the first extension of the Suspension Act, Burke simi-
larly indicated that detaining Americans as prisoners of war was lawful and preferable to holding
them as accused criminals. 19 PARLIAMENTARYHISTORY, supra note 81, at 462. “Your generals
on the other side of the Atlantic have established a public cartel, such as is agreed to, with an
alien enemy, for the exchange of prisoners.” Id. (If that is a correct quotation, Burke also under-
stood that the Americans were like, but were not, alien enemies.). The rejection of any such
agreement for Americans captured in Europe showed “the inconsistency of administration.”
Id. at 463.
[Britain’s] subjects in America, taken with arms in their hands, the last
stage of resistance to the civil power [were] treated as fair, open, alien
enemies[,] [while] the mere suspicion of the same crime in Europe
[was] treated with all the rigour due to acts of the most deliberate and
inveterate treason.
Id. The administration’s position, he said, was “preposterous and absurd” and the extension
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former as an instance of the latter. It is also quite unlikely that Burke’s understanding
of the difference was idiosyncratic. By the time his bill was adopted, a majority of
the House of Commons had come to oppose the policy of offensive operations in
North America.188
The 1782 statute was not a suspension.189 Nor was it an early recognition of
American independence, as Professor Tyler suggests it was.190 On that score, Parlia-
ment’s words could hardly have been more clear. Burke’s statute referred to
“revolted colonies,” not the United States of America.191 British usage at the time
distinguished sharply between revolted colonies and the United States.192 The former
were part of the empire; the latter would be an independent country.193
“Revolted” meant “in rebellion” and not “independent,” and “colonies” meant
colonies, not separate sovereigns. That usage is evident from the way the King and
his Parliament employed the words.194 On March 17, 1778, King George told both
Houses of Parliament of a message from the French Ambassador informing him that
“unnecessary” because it created a power to confine “people, who in the end, must come in
under the faith of a cartel [a POW exchange agreement].” Id. Either the Suspension Act should
expire or the government should maintain consistency by dissolving the cartel in America.
Id. (No formal cartel existed, although POW exchanges took place without one.). Burke
disapproved of suspension, regarded the Americans as subjects, and thought they should be
treated as fair, open, alien enemies, even though they were not the last, being subjects. He
did not think that holding British subjects as prisoners of war was unlawful, and did not think
that suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act was needed to make it lawful, as he proposed
holding Americans as POWs on both side of the Atlantic as one way to maintain consistency.
188 Letter from Edmund Burke to James Bourdieu, supra note 173, at 393 (describing
opposition to Suspension Act). In late February 1782, the House of Commons adopted an
address to the King that harshly criticized “the further prosecution of offensive war on the
continent of North America, for the purpose of reducing the revolted colonies to obedience
by force.” 22 PARLIAMENTARYHISTORY, supra note 81, at 1085. Lord North and his ministry
resigned a few weeks later on March 20, 1782, and were replaced with a cabinet headed by
the Marquis of Rockingham. HARRYM.WARD,THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 191–92 (1995).
189 See Exchange of American Prisoners Act 782, 22 Geo. 3 c. 10 (Gr. Brit.).
190 By adopting Burke’s proposal, “Parliament chose a course commensurate with the
direction of peace negotiations—namely, one that suggested that it no longer viewed the colo-
nists as owing allegiance but instead viewed them as members of a newly formed and wholly
separate nation.” Tyler, supra note 3, at 950–51. In her more recent work Professor Tyler
says that Burke’s bill was adopted “once the British recognized the inevitability that the lines
of allegiance would be severed with the Americans.” Amanda L. Tyler, Habeas Corpus and the
American Revolution, 103 CALIF.L.REV. 635, 693 (2015) [hereinafter Tyler, Habeas Corpus
and the American Revolution]. As this Article explains, American independence was not
inevitable at that point, except perhaps in hindsight. See infra notes 205–09 and accompanying
text. Moreover, legal consequences that attach to inevitable events do not actually arise until
the event occurs, no matter how clearly it was coming. As the maxim goes, the living have
no heirs. The consequences of the most inevitable event of all come with it, not before.
191 22 Geo. 3 c. 10.
192 Tyler, Habeas Corpus and the American Revolution, supra note 190, at 693.
193 See 22 Geo. 3 c. 10 (referring to “revolted colonies”).
194 19 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 81, at 908.
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France had entered into a treaty with “certain persons employed by his Majesty’s
revolted subjects in North America.”195 In response to that “offensive communica-
tion” the King had recalled the British ambassador.196 The French knew the words
that would make their point: the offensive communication began, “[t]he United
States of North America, which are in full possession of the Independence declared
by their act of the 4th July 1776.”197
The actions of King George and Parliament after the 1782 POW statute confirm
that it was no recognition of American independence.198 Later that year Parliament took
a step toward reconciliation, but not yet independence, the words and substance of
which demonstrated that in Parliament’s view America was still part of the Empire.199
In June, Parliament adopted “[a]n act to enable his Majesty to conclude a peace or truce
with certain colonies in North America.”200 That statute named New Hampshire and
Massachusetts Bay and all the others, but called them colonies, not states.201 It was
needed to relieve the economic sanctions that Parliament had previously imposed
on the colonies in the Prohibitory Act.202 That it did not recognize actual independ-
ence is shown by the continued reference to colonies, now without the demeaning
word “revolted,” and to a possible truce, which would be an interim measure, and
also by the fact that the power it gave to suspend sanctions was only temporary.203
195 Id. at 912 (message to the House of Lords). In Henry IV, Part 1, King Henry refers to
Edmund Mortimer, who has joined a rebellion that the King plans to put down, as “revolted
Mortimer.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,HENRY IVPART 1act 1, sc. 3, l. 92. Shakespeare’s King
Henry was no more acknowledging that Mortimer had usurped his crown or carved out a new
realm than King George was acknowledging that the Americans had achieved independence.
King George had used similar terminology in opening the first session of Parliament after the
Americans declared independence. 18 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 81, at 1369. In
justifying his efforts to return the Americans to obedience to the laws, he explained: “No people
ever enjoyed greater happiness, or lived under a milder government, than those now revolted
provinces.” Id.
196 19 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 81, at 912.
197 Id. at 913.
198 See Exchange of American Prisoners Act 1782, 22 Geo. 3 c. 10 (Gr. Brit.).
199 Truce with America Act 1782, 22 Geo. 3 c. 46 (Gr. Brit.).
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 The bill was introduced by Attorney General James Wallace, who explained that it was
designed “to remove certain bars and impediments which stood in the way of peace,” including,
for example, the Prohibitory Act, which cut off all commerce between Great Britain and the
colonies until they were restored to the King’s peace. 22 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 81, at 1103.
203 22 Geo. 3 c. 46. The King, in his speech from the throne ending the session of Parliament
at which that Act was adopted, discussed peace and harmony, but not independence. The
King stated:
The extensive powers with which I find myself invested to treat for recon-
ciliation and amity with the colonies which have taken arms in North
America, I shall continue to employ in the manner most conducive to
the attainment of those objects [“the return of peace,” stated earlier in
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The King himself identified the point at which recognition of American inde-
pendence occurred.204 In his speech opening Parliament on December 5, 1782, after
the provisional treaty had been adopted,205 he explained that in keeping with the
wishes of his Parliament and his people, he had directed all his efforts to a reconcili-
ation with the North American colonies:
Finding it indispensable to the attainment of this object, I did not
hesitate to go the full length of the powers vested in me, and
offered to declare them free and independent states, by an article
to be inserted in the treaty of peace. Provisional articles are agreed
upon, to take effect whenever terms of peace shall be finally
settled with the court of France.206
Parliament too recognized the provisional treaty as the point of independence.207
Only after that treaty had been adopted did the British legislature enact a statute
permanently lifting trade restrictions with respect to a political body that it called,
for the first time, the United States of America.208
The political situation in 1782 explains why King and Parliament were not ready
to recognize American independence in March of that year, when Burke’s bill was
adopted.209 The government that replaced Lord North’s in the spring adopted a
diplomatic strategy under which independence was not to be accepted unilaterally
by Britain. The King continued to hope for reconciliation.210 Lord Shelburne,
the speech], and with an earnestness suitable to their importance.
23 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 81, at 202.
204 23 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 81, at 206.
205 Id. at 205–06.
206 Id. at 206.
207 See Trade with America Act 1783, 23 Geo. 3 c. 26 (Gr. Brit.).
208 Id. (lifting sanctions on the United States). Referring to the King’s decision to treat Charles
Lee as a prisoner of war and not to try him as a traitor or a deserter, the Sparks Committee
of the Massachusetts Historical Society wrote in 1861:
We [the Americans] were still the “rebels” we had been declared to be
by the Proclamation of 1775,—a character in which we never ceased,
indeed, to be regarded in the view of the king and his ministers, and in
the popular judgment of the British nation, until the Preliminary Treaty
put an end to the pretension.
Sparks et al., supra note 83, at 337–38.
209 SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, THE DIPLOMACY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 192 (1935).
210 George III found “hard . . . to stomach” the resolutions calling for an end to offensive
operations, even though in principle they allowed him “to attempt to reduce [the colonies] to
obedience by peaceful means or by diplomacy.” Id. Bemis maintained that under the circum-
stances no peace was possible without American independence, id., but then pointed out that
the new ministry’s Secretary of State responsible for the American negotiations, Lord Shelburne,
still hoped for “the union of Great Britain and America under the same king, but with separate
sovereign parliaments.” Id. In his speech of December 5, 1782, opening the new session of
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directing the negotiations that were taking place in Paris, held American independ-
ence as a bargaining chip.211 Offering it to the colonists might induce them to abandon
their French allies for a separate peace.212 Independence was thus not to be preemp-
tively conceded, but to be given only in exchange for valuable diplomatic consider-
ation.213 No such consideration had been forthcoming when Burke’s bill was adopted.214
In British usage at the time of the framing, “suspension of the Habeas Corpus
Act” and cognate phrases referred only to legislation that authorized the Crown to
hold subjects on criminal grounds without complying with the requirements of the
Habeas Corpus Act.215 Those phrases did not refer to statutes that authorized other
forms of detention related to national security, like confinement pursuant to a military
draft or as a prisoner of war in an internal armed conflict.216
II. AMERICAN SUSPENSIONS IN THE WAR OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
During the Revolution, the American states developed a new form of executive
detention that came to be called suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.217 The American statutes resembled British suspensions of the Habeas Corpus
Act in that they granted the executive substantial discretion to detain, but some of them
differed from British suspensions in an important way. Several states did not require
even suspicion that the detainee had committed a crime. Posing a danger was enough.218
The Continental Army followed the practice of the British Ministry regarding
its own citizens as prisoners of war.219 Some members of the British military were
American Loyalists who, in the view of the state governments, had become American
Parliament after the provisional articles had been entered into, King George made clear his
views about the price he had paid for peace: “In thus admitting their separation from the crown
of these kingdoms, I have sacrificed every consideration of my own, to the wishes and opinion
of my people.” 23 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 81, at 206–07.
211 JONATHAN R.DULL, ADIPLOMATICHISTORY OF THE AMERICANREVOLUTION 140 (1985).
212 The new cabinet under the Marquess of Rockingham was divided on this point, with
Foreign Secretary Charles James Fox favoring an immediate grant of independence. Id.
“Shelburne, more cautious, was willing to recognize American independence only as part of
a comprehensive peace settlement with the United States.” Id. Probably seeing the line
Shelburne’s thinking took, American Minister Benjamin Franklin “eventually managed to
convince Shelburne that if Britain offered sufficiently generous peace terms America would
help Britain reach agreement with France and Spain by threatening to make a separate peace.”
Id. at 141. Only at the end of July 1782, did “Shelburne finally capitulate[] to the necessity of
accepting American independence.” Id. at 145.
213 Id.
214 See Exchange of American Prisoners Act 1782, 22 Geo. 3 c. 10 (Gr. Brit.).
215 Petition of Right 1627, 3 Car. 1 c. 1, § 5 (Eng.).
216 See id.
217 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
218 See infra notes 232–35 and accompanying text.
219 See supra notes 152 and 157 and accompanying text (explaining the practice of the
British Ministry).
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citizens and hence committed treason by levying war on their own country.220
General Washington decided to hold such prisoners as POWs, and not as accused
traitors, in order to avoid retaliation.221
A. America’s New Form of Suspension
Americans were far from united in support of war and independence.222 Active
Loyalism easily could be treason, or some lesser but still serious offense.223 Ill-
disposed persons, however, might be dangerous before they had done anything harmful
to the cause of independence, and before they were suspected of having done anything.
In response to this situation, several American states enacted detention statutes that
went beyond British suspensions of the Habeas Corpus Act, which required suspi-
cion that a crime had been committed.224 A leading example is a Massachusetts
statute of 1777, which authorized detention of “any person whom the council shall
deem the safety of the Commonwealth requires should be restrained of his personal
liberty, or whose enlargement within this state is dangerous thereto.”225 Such persons
were to be held “without bail or mainpri[z]e” until they were discharged by order
of the Council or the General Court (the legislature).226 (Massachusetts’s practice is
220 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 475 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed.,
1906).
221 Letter from George Washington to Thomas Gage (Aug. 11, 1775), in 1 THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON: REVOLUTIONARY WAR SERIES 289 (Philander D. Chase ed., 1985).
222 See infra notes 224–35 and accompanying text (discussing statutes passed by states,
representing various positions).
223 A war of secession puts residents of the secessionary part in a difficult position, as both
the established government and the secessionists will demand their loyalty and threaten to
punish disloyalty as treason. In June 1776, the Continental Congress resolved that “all persons
abiding within any of the United Colonies, and deriving protection from the laws of the same,
owe allegiance to said laws, and are members of such colony.” 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTI-
NENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 220, at 475. The resolution provided a definition of treason
and recommended that the Colonies pass laws to punish it. Id. In October of that year New
Jersey adopted a statute that in effect told Loyalists to change sides or leave. Act of Oct. 4, 1776,
ch. 5, 1776 N.J. Laws 5. It followed the Congress’s suggestion in providing that all who abided
within the state and derived protection from its laws owed allegiance, and provided for the
punishment of treason “from and after the Publication hereof,” thereby giving notice to all
residents that henceforth they would be held to allegiance to the new regime. Id.
224 E.g., Act of May 19, 1777, ch. 45, 1777 Mass. Acts 641.
225 Id.
226 Id. Mainprize was an old writ similar to bail that enabled someone who had been arrested
to be released by giving sureties who would assure his appearance. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *128. Eliminating bail is not the same as barring habeas corpus. Bail is a means
by which someone who is lawfully detained is allowed substantial physical freedom while
still having to return for trial. A grant of bail is not a complete release from custody, the way
release on habeas corpus is, because a bail proceeding does not adjudicate the lawfulness of
confinement the way a habeas proceeding does. Thus, the Massachusetts statute did nothing
explicit to bar judicial inquiry into whether the people arrested were properly held. Id. It did
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especially importance because of its influence on the terminology used in the Sus-
pension Clause, and is discussed in more depth below.)227
Virginia’s grant of executive detention authority was a bit more focused than
that of Massachusetts, but not much.228 It enabled the Governor (with the Council’s
advice) to confine anyone “whatsoever, whom they may have just cause to suspect
of disaffection to the independence of the United States or of attachment to their
enemies.”229 Although the cause had to be just, it had only to be cause to suspect,
and nothing more than disaffection to the Revolution had to be suspected.230 The
governor did not have to suspect that a crime had been committed.231
New Jersey authorized its Council of Safety “to apprehend any Person disaffected
to, or acting against the Government, or whom they shall suspect of being disaffected
to, or of having dangerous Designs against the Government, and such Person to com-
mit to any Gaol within this State.”232 The latter clause allowed detention on suspicion
of dangerous purpose and not just suspicion of having committed a crime.233 New York
created a board of commissioners for dealing with conspiracies, and authorized it:
[T]o apprehend and confine or cause to be apprehended and
confined in such manner and under such restrictions and limita-
tions as to them shall appear necessary for the public safety all
persons whose going at large shall in the judgment of the said
commissioners or any three of them appear dangerous to the
safety of this State.234
It is possible to be dangerous without having committed any crime and possible to
be suspected of being dangerous while in fact being harmless.
Maryland granted its governor and council, in case of invasion, “full power and
authority to arrest, or order to be arrested, all persons whose going at large the governor
and council shall have good grounds to believe may be dangerous to the safety of
this state,” to confine those so arrested, to limit them to particular districts of the state,
keep the courts from allowing people who were lawfully detained to go free temporarily by
arranging bail. Id.
227 See discussion infra Section II.C.
228 Act of May 17, 1781, ch. 7, 1781 Va. Acts, 10 Hening’s Statutes at Large 413–14.
229 Id. The Virginia statute operated on the right and, despite mentioning habeas, not on
issuance of the writ. Id. It did not deny access to habeas, but provided that no one was to be set
at liberty by bail, mainprize, or habeas corpus. Id.
230 Id.
231 See id.
232 Act of Oct. 11, 1777, ch. 40, § 4, 1777 N.J. Laws 85.
233 Id.
234 Act of Feb. 5, 1778, ch. 3, 1778 N.Y. Laws 9. The statute went on to direct judges and
magistrates not to bail anyone so confined, nor to deliver such persons from the jails unless
they had been indicted and tried. Id.
Habeas Corpus
Id.









B. American Citizens as Prisoners of War During the Revolution
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C. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 and the Terminology of Suspension of
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could decide for itself whom to confine would go farther in protecting natural liberty
than would a speedy trial requirement in criminal cases, even though the latter was
a very important point in the British statute.353
Hamilton’s brief discussion thus points in more than one direction. He may well
not have thought about the clause’s meaning in depth, at the Federal Convention or
while writing The Federalist. Hamilton most likely was not present on the day the
clause was adopted, though he did serve on the Committee of Style, which put the
clause in Article I, Section 9.354 Both times Hamilton discussed the Suspension
Clause in The Federalist, it was in response to a criticism of other aspects of the
Constitution, not as part of an exposition of that provision similar, for example, to
his account of the heads of federal jurisdiction in Article III.355 His collateral state-
ments about the Suspension Clause may not have reflected careful thought.
When the Suspension Clause appeared elsewhere in the ratification debates, it
often arose in the same context as in Federalist Nos. 83 and 84: the debate over
affirmative limitations and in particular a bill of rights.356 According to critics, the
clause undermined the Federalists’ argument that affirmative limitations were not
needed because liberty was protected by the principle of enumerated federal power.357
The clause limits a power that Congress has only by implication: nowhere does the
Constitution specifically authorize suspension.358 The principle of enumerated power,
critics argued, was less protective than might seem.359 If Congress had implied
353 Habeas Corpus Act 1679, 31 Car. 2 c. 2, § 1 (Eng.).
354 According to the editors of the Papers of Alexander Hamilton, Hamilton left the Conven-
tion for New York soon after August 13 and probably returned between September 1 and 6.
4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 235, 243 n.1 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962). The Sus-
pension Clause was adopted on August 28. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, supra note 301, at 438.
355 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 329, at 534 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing
that the scope of the judicial power under Article III implements correct principles regarding
the federal judicial function).
356 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 329, at 562 (Alexander Hamilton); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 329, at 575–77 (Alexander Hamilton).
357 See Brutus, Brutus II, N.Y.J., Nov. 1, 1787, reprinted in 19 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 154–59 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2003).
358 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
359 Brutus, an especially sophisticated Anti-Federalist writing in New York, argued that the
Suspension Clause showed that the Constitution included implied powers that could affect
important rights, so the principle of enumerated federal power was not adequate and the
Constitution should have a bill of rights. Brutus, supra note 357, at 154–59. Responding to
the Federalist argument that affirmative limitations were not needed because everything that
was not given in a grant of power was reserved by the people, id. at 156, Brutus pointed to the
Suspension Clause and other limitations in Article I, Section 9.
Does this constitution any where grant the power of suspending the habeas
corpus, to make expost facto laws, pass bills of attainder, or grant titles
of nobility? It certainly does not in express terms. The only answer that
can be given is, that these are implied in the general powers granted. With
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power to suspend habeas corpus, it might have implied power to regulate the press.360
While the Suspension Clause thus figured in a larger debate about enumerated
power and affirmative limitations, its content had nothing to do with that debate.
The opponents’ arguments rested on the clause’s character as an affirmative limita-
tion, not on the substance of that limitation.361 Exchanges about the clause in that
respect thus cast little light on that content.
As the difficulty in identifying Hamilton’s assumptions shows, statements that the
clause would secure the Habeas Corpus Act or the habeas corpus are not very informa-
tive for today’s readers.362 The Act had a requirement of specificity in commitment
equal truth it may be said, that all the powers, which the bills of rights,
guard against the abuse of, are contained or implied in the general ones
granted by this constitution.
Id. at 158.
360 At the beginning of his explanation that the Suspension Clause and other parts of Article I,
Section 9 guarded against implied powers, Brutus gave “the liberty of the press” as an example
of a right that should have been explicitly protected and not left to the principle of enumerated
powers. Id. at 157–58.
Responding to that argument in the Virginia ratifying convention, Edmund Randolph,
a delegate to the Federal Convention, gave a response that shows the difficulty of interpreting
many statements about habeas corpus and its suspension in the ratification debates. Randolph
replied that “by virtue of the power given to Congress to regulate courts, they could suspend
the writ of habeas corpus.” 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 357, at 1348. That statement may suggest that Randolph believed
that suspension would interfere with the judicial remedy. On the other hand, British suspen-
sions gave the Crown discretion to detain by changing the procedural rights of accused criminals.
Suspension acts reduced the requirements for a proper criminal commitment and delayed trial
beyond the statutory timetable. Confinement on mere suspicion during the term of a deten-
tion act allowed virtually arbitrary detention. Lawful grounds for criminal arrest and the
schedule of criminal trials are aspects of criminal procedure and so proper objects for legislation
regulating the courts. Randolph thus may have thought that, absent the Suspension Clause
Congress, like Parliament, would have been able to confer wide detention authority on the
executive by changing the rules about confinement on criminal charges.
361 See Brutus, supra note 357, at 154–59.
362 In the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, Jasper Yeates described the Suspension Clause
as “directing that the privilege of the habeas corpus act shall not be suspended except in times
of immediate danger.” Jasper Yeates, Speech Before the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention
(Nov. 30, 1788), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION, supra note 357, at 435. Yeates, a Pennsylvania native and lawyer who had studied at the
Inns of Court, may have associated the language of the Suspension Clause with the British
concept of suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act. In a February 1788 letter to Alexander Donald,
Thomas Jefferson expressed the hope that nine states would ratify to “secure to us the good”
the Constitution contains, while the other four would hold out for a bill of rights that would
ban “suspensions of the habeas corpus.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Alexander Donald
(Feb. 7, 1788), in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 357, at 353–54. Jefferson may well have meant that phrase to be short for suspension
of the Habeas Corpus Act, or he may have meant to refer to legislation that would operate on
the remedy of habeas corpus, which British suspension acts did not. Even seeming references
to the writ properly speaking may really have been to the Act. In a speech on June 4, 1788, to the
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warrants, a timetable for trial of felonies, and a remedy to enforce those require-
ments, the statutory writ.363 It implemented the principle that arbitrary detention on
criminal or supposed criminal grounds was impermissible, and, along with the
common law, was part of the British legal system’s protection of natural liberty against
executive discretion.364 A statement that the Suspension Clause secures the Habeas
Corpus Act could refer to any of those features or some combination of them.365 The
phrase “the habeas corpus” was even less clear, because it could refer to the Act or the
writ, and as to the latter could mean the statutory writ, the common law writ, or both.366
While the sources do not make possible a clear and detailed account of partici-
pants’ understanding of the Suspension Clause, they do associate the clause with fear
of arbitrary detention by the executive. That was Hamilton’s theme in both numbers
of The Federalist in which he discussed the clause.367 In January 1788, with the
Massachusetts ratifying convention just begun, Boston newspaper The American
Herald editorialized to the convention concerning the dangers of suspension: “[I]t
will be in the power of the President, or President and Senate, as Congress shall think
proper to empower, to take up and confine for any cause, or for any suspicion, or for
no cause, perhaps any person, he or they shall think proper,” and confine that person
throughout the suspension, which may last indefinitely.368
As the Herald’s comments show, the Suspension Clause cut two ways.369 It both
affirmed and limited the power to suspend, and so was both a protection and proof of
Virginia ratifying convention, delegate George Nicholas is reported to have discussed the many
contests between the English Crown and the people that terminated in favor of the people,
including “[t]he habeas corpus under Charles the IId.” George Nicholas, Speech Before the
Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 4, 1788), in 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 357, at 928. As an editorial note in the Docu-
mentary History explains, Nicholas meant the Act. Id. at 942 n.14. That statute was passed under
Charles II, while the writ had existed long before. A few days later, in a speech on June 6, he
responded to fears about federal power under the Constitution by pointing out that “[t]he suspen-
sion of the writ of habeas corpus is only to take place in cases of rebellion, or invasion. This
is necessary in those cases . . . .” Id. at 1002. Possibly Nicholas had switched from talking about
the Act on June 4 to talking specifically about the writ on June 6, though he may well have meant
the Act on the latter day too. See id. at 928, 1002. (It is also possible that his specific phrasing
was not correctly reported on one day or both.) Whether Nicholas knew that British statutes
suspending the Habeas Corpus Act did not affect the writ, except by changing the law that the
courts applied under it, is doubtful.
363 Habeas Corpus Act 1679, 31 Car. 2 c. 2 (Eng.).
364 See id.
365 See Yeates, supra note 362, at 435 (stating that the Suspension Clause protects the
“privilege of the habeas corpus act”).
366 See supra note 362 and accompanying text (explaining the confusion in terminology).
367 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 329, at 562 (Alexander Hamilton); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 329, at 577 (Alexander Hamilton).
368 To the Convention of Massachusetts, AM. HERALD (Boston), Jan. 14, 1788, reprinted
in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
357, at 709, 712.
369 See id.
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power.370 Both aspects came up in the debates in Maryland.371 Addressing the Maryland
House of Delegates on November 29, 1787, Federal Convention delegate James
McHenry stressed the protective aspect.372 Public safety may require suspension, he
argued, but in the absence of that necessity, “the virtuous Citizen will ever be protected
in his opposition to power.”373 Luther Martin, who attended the Federal Convention
for Maryland and refused to sign the Constitution, emphasized the arbitrary use of the
power to suspend.374 The national government could deem opposition to it by a state re-
bellion, “and suspending the habeas corpus act, may seize upon the persons of those
advocates of freedom, who have had virtue and resolution enough to excite the opposi-
tion, and may imprison them during its pleasure in the remotest part of the union.”375
While Americans’ knowledge of the details of British suspension may have been
limited, many understood the fundamental point: suspension greatly enhanced the
ability of the executive to detain whomever it wished.376
IV. THE AMERICAN CONCEPT OF SUSPENSION IN THE 1780S AND
THE MEANING OF THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE
This part of the Article argues that the Suspension Clause limits Congress’s au-
thority to give the executive very broad discretion to detain individuals. Grants of
detention authority that are substantially constrained by legal rules are not suspen-
sions and are not limited to cases of rebellion or invasion. Section A brings together the
historical background concerning British and American suspensions and shows that
their defining feature, and the reason they were thought of as dangerous, is the dis-
cretion they conferred on the executive. Section B then explains how the text of the
Suspension Clause can be understood to be directed specifically at discretionary
detention by the executive.
A. Suspension and Discretion
This Section presents a conceptualization of suspension that synthesizes the
British and American suspension statutes that form the background to the Suspension
Clause. It argues that the underlying feature shared by those statutes is a grant of
extremely broad discretion to the executive to detain individuals. In general, those
370 Compare id., withTHE FEDERALIST NO.83, supra note329, at 562 (Alexander Hamilton).
371 Maryland’s Constitutional Convention Delegates, Address Before the State House of
Delegates (Nov. 29, 1787), in 11 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 357, at 84, 197.
372 See id. at 84.
373 Id.
374 Luther Martin, Genuine Information VIII, BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Jan. 22, 1788, re-
printed in 11 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 357, at 197.
375 Id.
376 See, e.g., id.
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statues expanded detention authority without affecting the judicial remedy of habeas
corpus at all.377
British and American practice and usage provide the applications that the concept
of suspension of the privilege of the writ must account for. They identify two kinds of
statutes that were understood to be suspensions: British-style grants of authority to hold
suspected and accused criminals indefinitely and American-style grants to hold people
who were thought to be dangerous indefinitely.378 That practice also identifies many
interferences with natural liberty such that a statute explicitly authorizing them would
not be a suspension. Imprisonment for debt, civil commitment for mental disability,
quarantine, and arrest in the process of military enlistment are all examples.379 So
is detention of prisoners of war, without regard to the nationality of the prisoner.380
Long-standing British and American views about natural liberty, and the writ of
habeas corpus, provide a theme that explains that pattern: suspensions create exception-
ally broad executive discretion to choose whom to detain.381 The discretion conferred
by American suspensions ranged from wide to virtually unfettered.382 British suspen-
sions required suspicion of crime, but that too gave the executive a very wide scope
of choice.383 Even if a suspension act required suspicion of treason, treason was
377 As discussed above, in 1785 Massachusetts adopted a general habeas corpus law under
which the writ would not have to issue when the commitment warrant showed that the petitioner
was held pursuant to a valid suspension. That arrangement kept the courts from actually issuing
the writ and having the prisoner brought before them while preserving the judicial role of ensur-
ing that detention was in accordance with law. See supra notes 278–89 and accompanying text.
378 See supra notes 217–18, 224–26 and accompanying text.
379 In the 1758 debate in Parliament concerning impressment and habeas corpus, an unidenti-
fied opponent of legislation that would extend the 1679 Act to involuntary recruits pointed to
a problem with extending habeas to all forms of detention, not just commitment on criminal
grounds: such a law could be used to bring before the court an individual on a ship under quaran-
tine, with a “noxious consequence” that was “too obvious to be explained.” 15 PARLIAMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 81, at 890. In the longer version of his opinion for the House of Lords
on the 1758 bill, Chief Justice Wilmot of the Common Pleas pointed to several forms of non-
criminal detention not covered by the Habeas Corpus Act or the statutory writ: “Persons who
are bailed, Paupers in Hospitals or Workhouses, Madmen under Commissions of Lunacy, or
Confined by Parish Officers.” JOHN EARDLEY WILMOT, Answer to Questions Put to the Judges,
NOTES OF OPINIONS AND JUDGMENTS DELIVERED IN DIFFERENT COURTS 91–92 (London, Luke
Hansard 1802). Imprisonment for debt was also a familiar feature of English law. Ford, supra
note 49, at 26–27 (discussing the history of imprisonment for debt). The debate in 1758 was
about imprisonment as part of the military draft, another form of noncriminal deprivation of
liberty. See supra notes 100–16 and accompanying text.
380 The British Statute of 1782 confirms this point. See supra notes 142–45 and accom-
panying text. Whether the Crown’s powers under the unwritten law applicable in an internal
war included holding subjects as POWs is a distinct question. I think that it did, but the 1782
statute alone is enough to show that subjects could be held as POWs in an internal war without
suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act.
381 See supra notes 74–76, 246 and accompanying text.
382 See supra notes 217–18 and accompanying text.
383 See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
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easily committed by plotting. Suspension acts generally were adopted when plots
were in the air, often along with actual armed action as in the Jacobite rebellions.384
Suspicion, of course, was easy to come by, and could amount to nothing more than
rumor. An unsworn allegation that someone was involved in a plot against the King
was enough.385
Other forms of detention were much more governed by law that constrained the
executive, to the extent that the executive was involved in decision making. In
particular, those forms rested on legal rules that very substantially limited the class
of people to be detained, and often did not involve the executive at all. Imprison-
ment for debt required a judgment.386 Civil commitment of the mentally ill rested on
individualized determinations concerning the detainee’s mental condition.387 Re-
cruiting Acts were quite detailed.388 Quarantine statutes, which sometimes provided
for the exercise of executive judgment, directed that judgment to the quite specific
and reasonably objective question of likelihood of contagion.389
Detention of enemy aliens under the law of war was similarly governed by legal
principles that identified with precision the individuals who could be deprived of
their liberty.390 From 1798 to today, the President has had statutory authority to detain
enemy alien civilians who are present in this country in time of war or invasion.391
384 See supra notes 88–97 and accompanying text (discussing Parliament’s reaction to a 1714
rebellion); see also Militia Act 1745, 19 Geo. 2 c. 2 (Gr. Brit.) (permitting the King to detain
anyone suspected of conspiring against him in response to the 1745 Jacobite rebellion).
385 See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
386 Ford, supra note 49, at 27–28 (discussing the development of arrest to enforce judg-
ments at common law).
387 For example, eighteenth-century statutes authorized Justices of the Peace to order the
confinement of individuals whose mental disturbance made it dangerous for them to go abroad.
See Justices Commitment Act 1743, 17 Geo. 2 c. 5, § 20 (Gr. Brit.).
388 See, e.g., Recruiting Act 1756, 29 Geo. 2 c. 4 (Gr. Brit.) (laying out substantive criteria
and procedures for draft of soldiers).
389 For example, the Quarantine Act of 1753 authorized the Privy Council to identify places
from which it was probable that infection would be brought and imposed quarantine on vessels
originating in those places. Quarantine Act 1753, 26 Geo. 2 c. 6 (Gr. Brit.).
390 See infra notes 391–93.
391 The first Alien Enemies Act was adopted in 1798. Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577,
577 (1798) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 21). In cases of declared war or invasion or
predatory incursion, it authorized the executive to apprehend, secure, restrain, or remove
alien enemies. Id. As the Court noted in 1948, and as remains true today, “[t]his Alien Enemy
Act has remained the law of the land, virtually unchanged since 1798.” Ludecke v. Watkins,
335 U.S. 160, 162 (1948); 50 U.S.C. § 21 (detention authority in case of declared war or
invasion or predatory incursion). “[I]t would savor of doctrinaire audacity now to find the
statute offensive to some emanation of the Bill of Rights.” Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 171. In
Ludecke, the Court upheld the continued detention of a German national after the end of
actual hostilities because “the political branch of the Government ha[d] not brought the war
with Germany to an end.” Id. at 170.
Detention authority under the Alien Enemies Act is triggered by a declaration of war without
Report of 1800
Report of 1800 in
Report id.
Report
Virginia Resolutions in supra
See
See generally  supra 
See Common Interpretation: The Suspension Clause
See infra 
supra
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remedy of habeas corpus rested on the principle that the courts could apply legal
rules to determine whether detention was lawful.399 If confinement at the discretion of
the executive were permissible, the writ would have no effect even when issued.400
On both points Blackstone hardly could have been more clear.401 The common
law of England strongly protected natural liberty, and in particular protected it from
the will of the executive magistrate:
[P]ersonal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of chang-
ing situation, or removing one’s person to whatsoever place one’s
own inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint,
unless by due course of law. Concerning which we may make the
same observations as upon the preceding article [regarding bodily
security]; that it is a right strictly natural; that the laws of Eng-
land have never abridged it without sufficient cause; and, that in
this kingdom, it cannot ever be abridged at the mere discretion
of the magistrate, without the explicit permission of the laws.402
The remedial process protecting that right was habeas corpus.403 Blackstone recog-
nized that the right could be and was limited by the law, which he distinguished
from executive discretion.404 The danger from the latter was evident to him:
Of great importance to the public is the preservation of this per-
sonal liberty; for if once it were left in the power of any, the high-
est, magistrate to imprison arbitrarily whomever he or his officers
thought proper, (as in France it is daily practiced by the crown),
there would soon be an end of all other rights and immunities.405
Sometimes, Blackstone explained, the hazards associated with arbitrary executive
power over natural liberty had to be borne.406 “And yet sometimes, when the state is in
real danger, even this [confinement at the will of the executive] may be a necessary
measure.”407 The executive alone, however, was not allowed to decide whether that
grave a danger was at hand.408
399 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134.
400 Id. at *134–37.
401 Id.
402 Id. at *134
403 Id. at *135.
404 Id. at *134–35.
405 Id.
406 Id. at *136.
407 Id.
408 Id.
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But the happiness of our constitution is, that it is not left to the
executive power to determine when the danger of the state is so
great, as to render this measure expedient; for the parliament only,
or legislative power, whenever it sees proper, can authorize the
crown, by suspending the habeas corpus Act for a short and
limited time, to imprison suspected persons without giving any
reason for so doing.409
Blackstone likened suspension to the Roman appointment of a dictator, and said that
it should be done only “in cases of extreme emergency.”410
Fear of executive discretion crossed the Atlantic, and was manifest during the
ratification debates when they touched on the Suspension Clause.411 In discussing
the clause in connection with the need for a bill of rights, Hamilton stressed the dangers
of arbitrary executive power over natural liberty.412 Other participants similarly
expressed concern about the power of the executive.413
In 1807, twenty years after the Federal Convention met, Congress seriously
considered suspension for the first time, in response to the Burr conspiracy.414 The
Senate adopted a suspension statute after debate of which we have little record
today, but the House proceeded less hastily and ultimately rejected the bill.415 In that
debate the fear of untrammeled executive choice drove the opposition.416 According
to the Annals of Congress, Representative Burwell opposed suspension, arguing that
“[n]othing but the most imperious necessity would excuse us in confiding to the
Executive, or any person under him, the power of seizing and confining a citizen,
upon bare suspicion, for three months, without responsibility for the abuse of such
unlimited discretion.”417 Representative James Eliot of Vermont was unwilling to
409 Id.
410 Id.
411 See supra Section III.B.
412 Supra notes 330–33 and accompanying text.
413 Supra notes 367–68 and accompanying text.
414 DAVID P.CURRIE,THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:THE JEFFERSONIANS,1801–1829,
at 131 (2001).
415 Id. at 131–33 (describing congressional reaction to calls for suspension). The bill used
the British form of suspension, authorizing the President to hold suspected traitors without
beginning the regular criminal process. Id.
416 Tyler, supra note 3, at 632. Professor Tyler explains that:
[T]hose who spoke were overwhelmingly of the view that a suspension
would constitute a sweeping grant to the executive of discretionary
authority to arrest and detain free from the normal legal restraints on
his powers. . . . this belief, along with a general skepticism as to the need
for such dramatic legislation under existing circumstances, ultimately
swayed House members to reject the Senate bill.
Id.
417 16 ANNALS OF CONG. 405 (1807). The Annals are not verbatim records, and so represent
the best account available to us but are not wholly reliable.
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give the President and any executive officers under him “unlimited and irresponsible
power over the personal liberty of [the] citizens . . . . What a vast and almost
illimitable field of power is here opened, in which Executive discretion may wander
at large and uncontrolled!”418 Representative John Eppes of Virginia, thought that
the situation did not justify placing the people’s liberty at the will of a single individual,
and was not ready “to suspend the personal rights of the citizen, and to give him, in
lieu of a free Constitution, the Executive will for his charter.”419
Suspension was not debated at length for more than fifty years after the Burr
episode.420 When the Union faced its greatest test, habeas corpus was a substantial
issue.421 President Lincoln purported to suspend the writ on his own authority, and
in 1863 Congress enacted legislation that both authorized and limited noncriminal
security detention.422 During the congressional debates it was accepted by all par-
ticipants that suspension meant giving the executive wide latitude to detain.423
Opponents denounced it for that reason, while supporters argued that the great
rebellion, accompanied by hidden disloyalty, demanded that this extraordinary step
be taken.424 Democratic Senator Willard Saulsbury of Delaware decried the plan to
put “the liberty of every citizen” at the “absolute will” of the President.425 Republi-
can Senator Jacob Collamer of Vermont maintained that the framers foresaw “trials
to the nation, when its existence will be in jeopardy,” and in those circumstances
permitted suspension.426 When that happened, the executive could take the extreme
step of arresting “people who had not committed crimes, and hold[ing] them to
prevent their committing crimes that would put the nation in jeopardy.”427
Throughout British and American history, suspensions of habeas corpus have
been seen as grave measures, not just because they involve restrictions on natural
418 Id. at 407–08.
419 Id. at 411.
420 See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (describing President
Lincoln’s suspension of the writ without congressional authorization). Lincoln’s suspension
of the writ and the ensuing debate marked the next lengthy debate after 1807.
421 See infra notes 422–27 and accompanying text.
422 See Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 146; Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755 (providing
for suspension of the writ).
423 See, e.g., CONG.GLOBE,37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1202–03 (1863). Senator Wilkinson argued
that “the strong arm of this Government ought to lay hold of every man who, in an hour like this,
is arraying himself directly or indirectly against the Government in its efforts to put down this
rebellion.” Id. at 1202. Senator Howard complained that the bill would allow any member of the
military to detain “the whole population of the United States, under the Constitution, both
in the loyal States and in the rebel States.” Id. Senator Saulsbury questioned “the propriety
of the policy . . . of arresting citizens in States without warrant where the courts of justice are
open, and in which the laws can be faithfully and freely administered.” Id. at 1203.
424 See id. at 1203.
425 Id.
426 Id. at 247.
427 Id.
700 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29:649
liberty, but because they involve vast discretion in the executive. To some extent,
they are a relaxation of the rule of law itself: the principle that the executive operates
according to legal rules and not its will.428 While strictly speaking an authorization
of discretionary action maintains the rule of law, being a law itself, it does so in
form but not substance. Hence its substance, even when useful to the common good,
is deeply troubling.
B. The Writ, the Right, and the Text
Any historically sound reading of the Suspension Clause must include Professor
Tyler’s and Professor Halliday’s basic insight: the clause limits Congress’s power
to grant detention authority to the executive.429 It is about the right of natural liberty,
and not just the writ of habeas corpus, if it is about the writ at all.430 Any textually
sound reading of the clause must explain how it is possible that a provision that
refers to “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus” operates with respect to the
substantive interest the writ protects.431
One answer to this puzzle, which has considerable historical force, is that
references to the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had taken on a nonliteral
meaning through linguistic drift. The starting point was the Habeas Corpus Act and
suspension thereof. That standard name is itself not the best description, even
though the statute dealt with the writ, because it mainly dealt with authority to
confine.432 An alternate and more descriptive name was the Liberty of the Subject
Act.433 But “Habeas Corpus Act” became dominant, and so statutes that did not
affect issuance of the writ came to be known as suspensions of the Habeas Corpus
Act.434 They also were called suspensions of the habeas corpus.435 That last phrase
was even more opaque than a reference to the Act, because it would not even tell the
uninformed reader or listener that it referred to a statute rather than a judicial
remedy.436 As habeas corpus was a distinctive entitlement of those who lived under
the common law, English or American, calling it a privilege was natural enough.437
428 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”).
429 See HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at 249; Tyler, supra note 3, at 903–04.
430 See Tyler, supra note 3, at 986 (stating that “[i]f the Suspension Clause does not guarantee
the citizen that he will either be tried or released [in the absence of a suspension] . . .; it guaran-
tees him very little indeed” (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 575 (2004) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (alterations in original))).
431 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
432 See Habeas Corpus Act 1679, 31 Car. 2 c. 2 (Eng.).
433 See id. (“An Act for the better securing the Liberty of the Subject . . . .”).
434 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
435 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
436 See Neil McFeeley, The Historical Development of Habeas Corpus, 30 SW. L.J. 585,
586–87 (1976) (detailing the history of habeas corpus as a common law writ).
437 See Halliday & White, supra note 7, at 593 (“[T]he English understood habeas corpus
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Thus, a phrase that referred obliquely to an expansion of detention authority might
acquire a new form even less transparent to its meaning.
The primary answer to the textual problem is the Massachusetts Constitution’s
habeas corpus provision.438 It said that “[t]he privilege and benefit of the writ of
habeas-corpus” was to be enjoyed, and was to be suspended only in exigent circum-
stances and for a limited time.439 The Massachusetts legislature characterized statutes
that expanded executive detention authority—without affecting the remedy at all—
as suspensions of the privilege of the writ.440 Such statutes qualified as, and indeed
were central examples of, suspension of the privilege and benefit of the writ.
That bald fact by itself is enough to show that the parallel language in the Federal
Constitution referred to statutes like British suspensions of the Habeas Corpus Act
and American revolutionary security-detention statutes that authorized discretionary
confinement without affecting the judicial remedy.441 A careful inquiry shows that
behind that simple fact of usage is a reasonably straightforward reading of the words
that refers to the right of natural liberty. The writ itself is a remedy, and it is natural
enough to think that the privilege “of” the writ is the entitlement that it issues
according to law.442 But the preposition “of” conveys a connection without precisely
specifying that connection. A warm day of summer is a day during summer, while a
warm coat of wool is made of wool. Any remedy is closely connected to the sub-
stantive right that it enforces, so the right of natural liberty is the privilege or the
benefit of the writ. Performance is the benefit of specific performance, just as the
benefit of an umbrella is protection from the rain.
In that sense, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is the legal interest that
the writ characteristically protects. To suspend that privilege is to contract that legal
interest temporarily. In the British system of liberty that Blackstone extolled, a
crucial part of the law regarding natural liberty was that confinement at the mere
will of the executive was unlawful.443 The King’s special commandment was not a
good return of the writ because the King could not confine his subjects simply
because he thought it wise.444 He had to act according to some law other than his
own discretion.445 Suspensions of the privilege of habeas corpus thus restricted that
as a privilege. One of the king’s brevia mandatoria (writs of command), it arose from the royal
prerogative and issued, on motion, at the discretion of the justices sitting in King’s Bench.”).
438 MASS. CONST. ch. VI, art. VII.
439 Id.
440 Supra notes 292–97 and accompanying text.
441 Compare U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, with MASS. CONST. ch. VI, art. VII, and Habeas Corpus
Act 1679, 31 Car. 2 c. 2 (Eng.).
442 See Amanda Tyler, Is Suspension a Constitutional Remedy?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333,
337 (2006) (describing the writ of habeas corpus as a “unique . . . constitutional remedy”).
443 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134–35.
444 See id. at *135.
445 See id.
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very basic substantive principle that the remedy of habeas corpus enforced by
measuring the executive’s decision against the law.446
Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus thus can reasonably be
understood to include a temporary replacement of law with executive will. While that
phrase is not as informative as it could be, the old British terminology of suspension
of the Habeas Corpus Act would not have been well suited to the framers’ purpose.447
American grants of enhanced detention authority often did not require even suspi-
cion of crime and so would not have been contrary to the Habeas Corpus Act because
they did not authorize commitment on criminal or supposed criminal grounds.448
Moreover, the Constitution did not impose on the new national government rules
about criminal confinement similar to those in the 1679 Act.449
In reaching for the language of the Massachusetts Constitution, the Federal
Convention thus struck a reasonable compromise between using familiar terminol-
ogy and fully spelling out what they had in mind.450 To do the latter would not have
been easy, because they sought to capture a subtle point. The Convention might
have referred to restriction of the right of personal liberty or personal freedom, using
those terms—as Dicey later would—to mean the right not to be subject to imprison-
ment, arrest, or physical coercion without legal justification.451 In a sense, however,
that right remains intact during a suspension, because a law giving the executive
discretion is a law, although not one that performs the usual function of law in this
context.452 Moreover, that phrase might be taken to refer to the interest in natural
liberty, and the Convention did not mean to limit all federal restrictions on natural
liberty to cases of rebellion or invasion. For example, quarantine laws were and are
a natural exercise of the commerce power.453 Because the writ of habeas corpus was
the means by which substantive legal constraints on detention were enforced against
the executive, referring to the privilege of the writ was a reasonable way to refer to
the existence of law-like limitations on executive authority.454
446 See id. at *136.
447 See supra notes 378–80 and accompanying text.
448 See supra notes 412–28 and accompanying text.
449 For example, the Habeas Corpus Act required that accused traitors be tried within two
terms of the courts. Habeas Corpus Act 1679, 31 Car. 2 c. 2 (Eng.). The Constitution does
not prescribe court terms.
450 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, with MASS. CONST. ch. VI, art. VII.
451 “The right to personal liberty as understood in England means in substance a person’s
right not to be subjected to imprisonment, arrest, or other physical coercion in any manner
that does not admit of legal justification.” A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE
LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 124 (8th ed. 1915). Later in that paragraph, Dicey referred to
“personal freedom in this sense,” apparently using the two formulations interchangeably. Id.
452 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755 (a statute providing for the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus).
453 The Surgeon General has authority to limit introduction of persons and property from
foreign countries in order to prevent the spread of disease to this one. 42 U.S.C. § 265.
454 See supra notes 411–27 and accompanying text.
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One difficulty in recovering the original meaning of the Suspension Clause
results from the fact that even many reasonably sophisticated Americans no doubt
were not well informed about actual British and American usage and practice.455
Probably some Americans believed that the British Habeas Corpus Act regulated
detention in general, and did not know that it was limited to criminal detention. In
similar fashion, some probably believed that the 1679 Act was the source of the writ
of habeas corpus, and not just the statutory version that it created while leaving the
common-law writ in place.456 Many almost certainly did not know that British
suspension acts did not limit the writ, and that they therefore suspended only the
substantive limits on criminal detention and not the remedial part of the 1679 Act.457
Given the variety of American suspension statutes during the Revolution, among
those who knew about those acts, very likely many did not know that some of those
statutes limited the issuance of the writ but most did not.
The reading presented here rests on an interpretive premise that this Article will
identify but not defend. The premise is that, when a legal text refers to an existing
legal phenomenon, the text refers to the phenomenon, even if the enactors of the text
may be mistaken about that phenomenon. Someone who adopted a rule about
suspensions of the habeas corpus, referring thereby to the British statutes that were
called by that name, might have been in error about the content of those statutes. In
my view, the reference is to the statutes, not to the drafter’s incorrect understanding
of them.
That approach may require the integration of facts about the law that no one at
the time had brought together. While the association of suspension with executive
discretion was well known when the Constitution was adopted, it may be that no
individual had come to the conclusion that discretion is the feature that unites British
and American suspensions. In order to understand the Suspension Clause, which
refers to the legal practices that were called suspension of habeas corpus and similar
names, that integration must be performed. The reading presented here, which relies
only on legal facts and concepts available at the time of the framing, may thus be
both novel and true to the original meaning.458
455 See infra notes 456–57 and accompanying text.
456 See supra notes 40–63 and accompanying text.
457 See supra notes 173–216 and accompanying text.
458 Other important twenty-first century interpretations of the Suspension Clause share the
limitation that they cannot simply point to someone who endorsed them at the time of the fram-
ing. Justice Scalia did not, and Professor Tyler does not, identify any individual who articulated
the readings they propose. For example, Professor Tyler does not present any source who says
that a suspension is a law that authorizes detention of individuals who are within protection
where the detention does not conform to the existing rules of criminal confinement. See gen-
erally Tyler, supra note 3. Given the current state of historical knowledge, any interpretation
of the Suspension Clause that reflects the facts concerning suspension is likely to bring those
facts together in a way that no single individual is today known to have done.
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V. THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
This Part addresses the question whether the Suspension Clause limits Con-
gress’s authority with respect to the writ of habeas corpus. It argues that, because of
other aspects of the Constitution, even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
includes the judicial remedy of the writ and not only the right of natural liberty, the
clause has the same effect it would have if the privilege referred only to the right.
That is not exactly to say that the clause provides no protection for the writ; it provides
only the protection that would arise as an incident to protection of the substantive
interest of natural liberty.
Whatever it may mean about the writ, the Suspension Clause is primarily a
substantive protection of the right of natural liberty.459 Just as the First Amendment
protects the freedom of speech against congressional abridgement, so the Suspen-
sion Clause limits the circumstances under which Congress may adopt a certain kind
of limit on natural liberty.460 In that respect, the Suspension Clause is no more about
the jurisdiction of the federal courts than the First Amendment.
This feature of the clause, which Professors Halliday and Tyler recovered for
this century, undercuts the reading according to which it in effect affirmatively
requires that the federal courts have habeas jurisdiction.461 As has long been known,
that interpretation of the clause encounters serious textual and structural objec-
tions.462 The Constitution does not require that there be any lower federal courts.463
It does ensure that there will be a Supreme Court and does give that court jurisdic-
tion.464 Only a little bit of that jurisdiction is original, however, and habeas is an
original proceeding.465 The vast bulk of possible habeas cases are outside the Court’s
original jurisdiction. As far as Article III is concerned, the habeas corpus jurisdiction
of the federal courts could be vanishingly small.466
In order to require federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, the Suspension Clause
would have to be an affirmative mandate that overrides the permission implied by
Article III’s reference to “such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish.”467 The Suspension Clause is written as a limitation, not
459 See Tyler, supra note 3, at 903–04 (describing the Suspension Clause as “arguably the
single most important source of protection of individual liberty in the Constitution”).
460 U.S. CONST. art I, § 9 (the writ of habeas corpus may be suspended only “when in Cases
of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it”).
461 See HALLIDAY, supra note 9, at 261; Tyler, supra note 3, at 903–04.
462 A penetrating statement of the difficulties appears in Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus,
Suspension, and Guantanamo: The Boumediene Decision, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 11–12.
463 Id. at 12.
464 U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2.
465 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (establishing the appellate and original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court).
466 Article III jurisdiction does not explicitly include habeas review. See U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2.
467 U.S.CONST. art. III, § 1. According to the orthodox view of Article III, the Constitution
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an affirmative command.468 The clause also contrasts with the Massachusetts provision
on which it was based.469 The Massachusetts Habeas Corpus Clause reads in full:
The privilege and benefit of the writ of habeas-corpus shall be
enjoyed in this Commonwealth in the most free, easy, cheap,
expeditious and ample manner; and shall not be suspended by
the Legislature, except upon the most urgent and pressing occa-
sions, and for a limited time not exceeding twelve months.470
The framers worked from the second part but did not include the first.471 They
included no affirmative grant or requirement of a grant.472 Moreover, the Suspension
Clause appears in Article I, but Article III would have been the place to put a grant
of jurisdiction that Congress could not alter, like the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.473
reads as it does on this point because the Federal Convention decided to leave the question
whether to have inferior federal courts to Congress. As James Madison was instrumental in
reaching that result, it is often known as the “Madisonian Compromise.” Michael G. Collins,
The Federal Courts, the First Congress, and the Non-Settlement of 1789, 91 VA. L. REV.
1515, 1519 (2005). (Professor Collins shows that contrary views have been held from the
very beginning. Id. at 1543–48. It is not entirely clear what Madison himself thought about
the topic when he served in the First Congress. Id. at 1555–62.) Professor Meltzer discussed
the implication of this feature of the Constitution:
For if Congress need not create federal courts at all, or may confer on
them only such portions of the categories of jurisdiction set forth in Article
III, Section 2, as it thinks advisable, then it might seem to follow that there
could be no inherent right to habeas corpus review in federal court.
See Meltzer, supra note 462, at 12.
468 As Professor Meltzer explained, the text:
[D]oes not explicitly guarantee the availability of habeas corpus, in the
way the Bill of Rights guarantees particular protections. Rather, the Sus-
pension Clause appears in a list of provisions in Article I, Section 9 that
limit the power of the government (and, specifically of Congress, in some
cases explicitly and in others implicitly) to enact certain kinds of laws.
Id. at 10–11 (footnote omitted).
469 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, with MASS. CONST. ch. VI, art. VII.
470 MASS. CONST. ch. VI, art. VII.
471 See supra Section III.A.
472 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended . . . .” (emphasis added)).
473 As discussed above, the drafting history of the Suspension Clause suggests that the
Federal Convention’s Committee of Style may have realized that the clause belonged in Article
I, Section 9, and not Article III, because it had only a prohibition and not an affirmative require-
ment like that found in the Massachusetts Constitution. Supra notes 319–28 and accompa-
nying text.
706 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29:649
One answer to this difficulty is to say that the power to issue habeas corpus writs
and decide pursuant to them is vested in the judges of the Supreme Court separately.474
While the Court itself has only very limited trial-level jurisdiction, that limitation
does not apply to the Justices themselves.475 It indeed does not, because the grant of
judicial power itself does not, nor the grant of jurisdiction.476 The former is to the
federal courts in general, the latter is to the Supreme Court.477 Judges exercise judicial
power by participating in the decisions of courts.478 A multimember court may act
through just one of its judges, as United States District Courts routinely do today,
or through a group of judges smaller than the entire complement, as the Courts of
Appeals generally do.479 In similar fashion, a Justice of the Supreme Court may act
for the Court, and the Justices do.480 But as far as the Constitution is concerned, it
is the Court that is acting; Article III grants no judicial power, and no jurisdiction,
to Supreme Court Justices as such.481
If the Suspension Clause is a mandate for habeas corpus jurisdiction, it clashes
with Article III in another way.482 Not only does the latter provision require only a
474 Professor Edward Hartnett proposes habeas authority in individual Justices as a solu-
tion to a problem posed by the Constitution as the Court interprets it. Edward A. Hartnett,
The Constitutional Puzzle of Habeas Corpus, 46 B.C. L. REV. 251, 275 (2005). The problem
arises from four principles that together are incompatible: (1) Lower federal courts are
optional for Congress to create, id. at 254–56; (2) the Supreme Court does not have original
jurisdiction over most habeas cases, id. at 256–58; (3) according to the Supreme Court, state
courts may not grant habeas relief to detainees held by federal officers, id. at 258–60; and
(4) the Suspension Clause requires that habeas be available to review detention by federal
officers, id. at 260–61. According to Hartnett, the ability of individual Justices to issue the
writ reconciles the Suspension Clause’s demand that the writ generally be available with the
limits on the jurisdiction of the Court itself and the possible and necessary unavailability of
lower federal and state courts respectively. Id. at 275. Another way to resolve the supposed
puzzle is to conclude that the Suspension Clause does not affirmatively mandate any federal
habeas jurisdiction. That conclusion is much easier to reach if the Clause’s function is
primarily to protect the substantive interest in natural liberty and not the judicial remedy that
protects it. See id. at 266–67.
475 See id. at 256–57, 271–73 (noting that under Marbury, the Supreme Court does not
have original habeas jurisdiction because original jurisdiction is strictly limited to that estab-
lished by Article III, whereas individual Justices or judges have had the power to issue habeas
writs since the original Judiciary Act of 1789).
476 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (vesting judicial power in the federal courts); id. § 2
(providing for original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court).
477 Id. §§ 1–2.
478 See id.
479 See 28 U.S.C. § 132 (single judge of district court may exercise court’s judicial power);
id. § 46 (courts of appeals may sit in panels or en banc).
480 See, e.g., SUP. CT. R. 22.
481 See U.S. CONST. art III, §§ 1–2.
482 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (listing the types
of cases to which the judicial power of the United States extends).
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supreme court with very limited original jurisdiction, it also specifies the cases to
which the judicial power of the United States extends.483 Not all possible habeas
corpus proceedings are on that list.484 An example from the time of the framing
illustrates the point. Habeas was sometimes used to determine whether the petitioner
lawfully could be held as a slave; Somerset was such a case.485 Consider a habeas
proceeding by a putative slave against a putative master, both born and residing in
the same state, in which the supposed slave claimed to have been manumitted by a
previous owner. Such a habeas case would come within none of the Article III heads
of jurisdiction, but it would be a habeas case.486 If the Suspension Clause creates
habeas jurisdiction, that case would be within it.487 If the response is that the Suspen-
sion Clause is implicitly limited by Article III, then it is limited by the optional
status of most federal trial-level jurisdiction.488
The text of the Suspension Clause is thus an unlikely vehicle for an affirmative
grant of jurisdiction or a mandate to Congress to create jurisdiction. The assumption
that the clause’s function is somehow to make sure that the writ is available might
nevertheless require an unlikely reading of the text. But with the recognition that the
clause is primarily a substantive protection of natural liberty, that assumption drops
away, and with it any imperative to bend the text and structure to achieve the
clause’s supposed purpose.489
To say that the Suspension Clause does not affirmatively require habeas jurisdiction
is not to say that it does not refer to the writ. As explained above, the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus includes the interest in freedom from detention at the discretion
of the executive.490 The privilege may also include the remedy that protects natural
liberty.491 If it does, exercises of Congress’s power over the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts nevertheless do not count as suspension of the privilege.492 Article III and
Article I together give Congress broad discretion concerning the lower federal courts.493
483 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
484 See id.
485 See generally Somerset v. Stewart (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499; Lofft 1 (holding that slavery
was not permitted by the law of England).
486 See id.; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (limiting the federal judicial power).
487 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
488 See id. art. III, §§ 1–2. If Article III’s grant of jurisdiction limits the Suspension Clause,
its provision that Congress may establish inferior courts must also limit the Suspension
Clause. See id.
489 The difficulties with interpreting the Suspension Clause as a guarantee that the writ will
be available in turn reinforce the reading according to which it limits Congress’s power over
natural liberty. That reading explains the clause’s function and does not require that it perform
functions its text is not suited to and that do not accord well with the rest of the Constitution.
490 See supra notes 381–428 and accompanying text.
491 See supra notes 429–31 and accompanying text.
492 See infra notes 493–94 and accompanying text.
493 Article I, Section 8 gives Congress power “[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court,” U.S.CONST.art. I, § 8, and Article III, Section 1 vests the judicial power “in one supreme
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When that discretion is exercised so as not to grant habeas corpus jurisdiction, that
congressional decision is not naturally described as a suspension of the writ, because
that which was not there to begin with is not suspended. As a result, even if the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus includes the writ itself, and not just the right
it protects, exercises of Congress’s jurisdictional powers do not constitute suspen-
sions, and so do not violate the clause insofar as it refers to the writ. That conclusion
arises because of the interaction between the clause, which refers not just to habeas
corpus but also suspensions of it, and the fact that the Constitution itself grants the
federal courts hardly any habeas corpus jurisdiction.
That is not necessarily to say that the clause has no effect at all on jurisdiction.
The privilege of the writ includes, if it is not limited to, the law protecting natural
liberty.494 One of the long-standing debates in American constitutional law is whether
a congressional rule about jurisdiction can be inconsistent with a substantive provision
like the First Amendment.495 According to some commentators, a jurisdictional rule
that is designed to keep some constitutional claims out of court, or influence the way
in which they are decided, may violate the constitutional provision that gives rise
to the claim.496 If that is correct, then the Suspension Clause should be treated the
way other substantive limits on congressional power are treated in this respect. The
Suspension Clause thus has the same effect on Congress’s authority over the
jurisdiction of the federal courts as does a wholly substantive limitation like the First
Amendment. Whether there is any such effect is a separate question.
While a failure to grant remedial authority is hard to describe as a suspension
of it, congressional restrictions on the habeas authority of state courts might more
readily come within the Constitution’s language. According to one standard reading
of the clause, congressional limitations on state habeas are suspensions of the
privilege of the writ and so are limited to rebellion and invasion. The classic state-
ment of this position is by William Duker.497 At first glance this reading has much
to commend it from the standpoint of the Constitution’s structure. Most important
is that it comports with the clause’s formulation as a prohibition, not a conferral of
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
494 See supra Section IV.A.
495 In his classic treatment of the topic, Gerald Gunther distinguished internal limits on
Congress’s power that arise from Article III and external limits that arise from other parts of the
Constitution, especially the affirmative limits like those found in the first eight amendments.
See Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinion-
ated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 900 (1984).
496 See id.
497 See WILLIAM F.DUKER,ACONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 126 (1980).
A recent review of writing on the topic appears in Todd E. Pettys, State Habeas Relief for
Federal Extrajudicial Detainees, 92 MINN. L. REV. 265, 309–11 (2007). Professor Pettys
does not consider the possibility that the Suspension Clause primarily limits restrictions on
the right of natural liberty rather than the judicial proceeding of habeas corpus. Id.
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authority or a command to exercise it.498 Moreover, it comports with the basic principle
that the Constitution largely takes for granted, but does not create, a judicial system,
with attendant remedies, through which legal challenges to government action may
be brought.499 That judicial system, as Henry Hart stressed, begins with the state
courts.500 They are the institutions that are specifically recruited by Article VI to
vindicate the supremacy of federal law, including the Constitution.501 Protection of
the habeas jurisdiction of the state courts may seem a natural precaution insofar as
it preserves a well-known remedy that protects a very basic interest.
But it may not have seemed so natural to the Federal Convention, and is not so
natural after a careful consideration of the document the convention produced. When
the framers decided to insulate from federal power any legal right or institution that
exists independently of the Constitution and federal law, their first instrument was
to avoid including a power that could affect the right or institution.502 Congress has
no power over the jurisdiction of the state courts as such, and more generally it has
no power over the structure of the state governments as such.503 This basic feature
of the Constitution is reinforced by the few places in which the document does deal
498 See Pettys, supra note 497, at 309.
499 See id. at 310.
500 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV.L.REV. 1362, 1401 (1953). Meltzer noted the connection
between Hart’s thinking and Duker’s claim about the Suspension Clause: “In the more specific
context of habeas corpus, this view suggests that the Suspension Clause, rather than guaranteeing
federal court habeas corpus jurisdiction, instead restricts the power of Congress to interfere
with state court habeas jurisdiction.” Meltzer, supra note 462, at 17–18 (citing DUKER, supra
note 497, at 126–80).
501 U.S. CONST. art. VI (requiring that “the Judges in every State shall be bound” by fed-
eral law).
502 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 329, at 577–78 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that
the Constitution, through the principle of enumerated federal power, limits governmental
authority and is itself a bill of rights).
503 State courts must apply federal law, but in general they do so within their own jurisdic-
tion and pursuant to their own procedures. “The general rule, ‘bottomed deeply in belief in
the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state
courts as it finds them.’” Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990) (quoting Henry M. Hart.,
Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM.L.REV. 584, 508 (1954)). The
Court has recognized a power in Congress to regulate the procedures in state court when it
exercises its substantive powers, but those cases do not rely on a congressional power over
state procedure or jurisdiction as such. Compare Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R.,
342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952) (holding that state courts must follow federal rules regarding jury
trial in cases resting on federal causes of action), with Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911,
922–23 (1997) (holding that state procedural rules are applicable regarding appeal in a case
resting on a federal cause of action because Congress has not prescribed a rule under its
substantive powers). The principle that Congress does not have general power to direct the
state governments is reflected in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 898–99 (1997), which
held that Congress could not require state law enforcement officers to execute federal law.
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with the relationship between the two governments. In particular, their judiciaries
are brought together at one point: the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
the United States as conferred by Article III.504 Congress can make laws necessary
and proper to carry that jurisdiction into effect, and can also make exceptions to it,
but it has no granted power about the state courts.505
Congress does not have general power over state court jurisdiction.506 Whether
or not the privilege of the writ includes the judicial remedy, Congress cannot affect
the remedy in state court by exercising a power it lacks. Insofar as it would protect
state court habeas, the Suspension Clause is thus cumulative of a restriction that
arises from the principle of enumerated powers. But while Congress does not have
general control of state court jurisdiction, it does have two kinds of power that may
be used to regulate it. First, Congress can establish tribunals inferior to the Supreme
Court, giving them jurisdiction within the scope set out in Article III.507 It can make
that jurisdiction exclusive of the state courts’, and has done so as to some cases since
the Judiciary Act of 1789.508 Congress thus can provide that habeas cases that are
within the Article III judicial power are to be heard exclusively in federal court. But
while it may be necessary and proper to limit the state courts in order to strengthen
the federal courts, simply limiting the state courts has no such connection to the
power to establish inferior federal tribunals and no such constitutional sanction.509 The
power to carry out federal court jurisdiction does not enable Congress to remove
cases from state jurisdiction without creating corresponding federal jurisdiction.
Second, Congress may be able to limit state court jurisdiction in the exercise of
its non-jurisdictional powers. Congress clearly may give federal officers privileges
to act in ways that otherwise would be unlawful, as for example when it authorizes
the use of military force to put down rebellion.510 Under the Supremacy Clause, state
courts must apply such federal law when it comes within their jurisdiction.511 It is
also possible, though I think doubtful, that Congress may restrict the jurisdiction of
504 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 338–39 (1816) (holding that
Article III contemplates appeals from state courts to the Supreme Court of the United States).
Congress could give lower federal courts appellate jurisdiction over state courts, but has never
done so. See id.
505 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (establishing the power to carry into execution other powers);
id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (establishing that Congress may make exceptions to the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction).
506 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (referring only to the judicial power of the United States).
507 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
508 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76 (granting district court admiralty jurisdiction
exclusive of state courts).
509 See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
510 See, e.g., Insurrection Act of 1807 (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–53) (allowing
for federal force to put down rebellions in states).
511 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[A]nd the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
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the state courts in order to protect federal officers, without creating corresponding
federal court jurisdiction. Any non-jurisdictional power it may have to limit state-
court jurisdiction and remedies, however, is subject to affirmative limitations that
apply to the relevant power.512 If Congress may not authorize executive officials to
detain people, it may not restrict state-court remedies in order to facilitate that
detention. If the Suspension Clause referred only to the interest in natural liberty, it
nevertheless would limit jurisdictional restrictions enacted in order to authorize
invasions of that interest. Here too, protection of the writ would be redundant of
another aspect of the Constitution, this time the Suspension Clause’s protection of
natural liberty itself.
The Suspension Clause is not an affirmative requirement, and hence does not
mandate any federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.513 It is a limit on congressional power,
most importantly on the power to authorize detention. If the privilege of the writ
includes the judicial remedy, that aspect of the clause still does not add anything to
other features of the Constitution that limit congressional authority. Congress’s lack
of general authority over state court jurisdiction, the internal limits on its ability to
make federal court jurisdiction exclusive, and the Suspension Clause’s substantive
protection of natural liberty, combine to duplicate any effect that would arise from
including the judicial remedy itself within the clause’s scope.
CONCLUSION
For many decades, the Suspension Clause has been subject to a basic confusion:
the assumption that it is primarily concerned with a judicial remedy, rather than a
primary right. Focusing instead on natural liberty and executive detention is very
fruitful. First, that focus leads to the original meaning of the clause, according to
which it protects natural liberty against executive discretion. Next, that focus shows
how strange is the reading according to which the clause is only about the remedy.
If Congress may enable the executive to hold people at discretion, the writ of habeas
corpus is of little importance. The return made on behalf of King Charles I, that the
petitioner is confined on commandment of the proper executive official, would be
sufficient.514 Habeas corpus is a remedy. It enforces, but does not contain, the sub-
stantive law of natural liberty.
With this new understanding, the Suspension Clause takes its place as a substantive
protection of a genuinely fundamental right: freedom from confinement at the discre-
tion of the executive. It is perhaps the Constitution’s most basic protection of liberty.
512 See Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Congressional Power, 89 TEMP.L.REV.1, 3 (2016).
513 Supra notes 467–73 and accompanying text.
514 See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text.
